Model based fault detection and isolation for a PEM Fuel Cell System by Lira, S. de
Model based Fault Detection and Isolation for
a PEM Fuel Cell System
Salvador de Lira Ramirez
Master of Science in Chemical Engineering
Advisors
Vicenç Puig
Joseba Quevedo
Automatic Control, Robotics and Computer Vision
Automàtica i Informàtica Industrial
Universidad Politecnica de Catalunya
A dissertation submitted for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
June 21, 2010
Universidad Politecnica de Catalunya
Automàtica i Informàtica Industrial
Title:
Model based Fault Detection and Isolation for a PEM Fuel Cell System
PhD. Thesis made in:
Universidad Politecnica de Catalunya - Campus Barcelona
C/ Pau Gargallo 5, 08028
Barcelona, Spain.
Advisors:
Vicenç Puig
Joseba Quevedo
© Salvador de Lira Ramirez 2010
CONTENTS
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4 Publications and Diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 State of art in Fault Diagnosis 3
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Scope of fault detection and fault isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1 Model-free methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2 Model-based methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Fault detection using systemmodels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.1 Analytical model-based fault detection techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2 Residual generation using observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Robustness issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.1 Passive robust approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
iii
2.5 Fault isolation using systemmodels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.1 Models applied to fault isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.2 Models mapping the space of binary fault signals into the space of faults 32
2.5.3 Models mapping the space of multi-value fault signals into the space of faults 34
2.5.4 Other models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.5 Model-based fault isolation techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 General approaches to fault isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.1 Fault isolation based on the binary diagnostic matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.2 Diagnosing based on the information system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6.3 Analytical model-based fault isolation techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3 PEM Fuel Cell SystemModel 49
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.1 Fuel Cell Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Fuel Cell Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 PEM Fuel Cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.1 PEM Fuel Cell System operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Mathematical Models in the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.1 Fuel Cell voltage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 PEM Fuel Cell Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5.1 Nexa Fuel Cell SystemModel: Auxiliary Components . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5.2 Static Compressor voltage controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5.3 Compressor dynamic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
iv
3.5.4 Supply Manifold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5.5 ReturnManifold Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.6 Humidifier Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.7 Hydrogen Control Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5.8 Cooling SystemModel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6 Structural Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7 PEM FC Linear Varying Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.8 Fault Modelling in a PEM Fuel Cell System:Fault Benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4 Fault Detection 75
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2 Robust fault detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3 Model uncertainty approximation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.1 Uncertainty propagation using sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.2 Uncertainty approximation using sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.3 Background on zonotopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3.4 Zonotopes operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 ROBUST FAULTDETECTION USING INTERVAL OBSERVERS . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4.1 Interval observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4.2 Interval observer design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5 Fault detection using interval observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5.1 Implementation of interval observers using zonotopes . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.6 Residual Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.7 Threshold Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
v
4.8 Residual Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5 Fault Isolation 97
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Relative sensitivity approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2.1 Relative fault sensitivity approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Structured Residual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.1 Proposed methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.2 Interval fault magnitude estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4 additive fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4.1 Fault Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4.2 Proposed methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.5 Directional Residuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6 Case Study 107
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.2 Nexa non-linear model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.3 Fault Benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.4 Fault diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.4.1 Fault Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.4.2 Fault Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.5 Fault Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7 Conclusions and FutureWork 109
vi
Bibliography 110
vii
viii
LIST OF TABLES
3.1 Classification of fuel cells. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Fuel Cell Advantage and disadvantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 The electrochemical half-reactions for the anode and cathode . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 Compressor voltage static feedforward controller. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 Corrected parameter correlation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Compressor map coefficients. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.7 Compressor parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.8 Compressor motor parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.9 Supply volume parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.10 Specific heat value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.11 Description of the fault scenarios implemented in FGB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1 Theoretical fault signature matrix using relative sensitivity respect to rl at ϑk . 99
5.2 Theoretical Fault Sensitivity signature matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3 Theoretical fault signature matrix using relative sensitivity respect to rl . . . . . 105
ix
x
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Structure of a diagnosis system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Fault diagnosis diagram using systemmodels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Architecture of model-based fault detection using residuals. . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Architecture of Generic residual generator: computational form. . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Fault isolation model mapping fault signals and faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 Binary fault detection and fault isolation architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.1 Diagram of a PEMFC stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 voltage for a typical low temperature, air pressure, fuel cell . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3 Compressor Process Diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4 Airflowmodel validation. a) Model and lab data comparison, b) Model error. . 61
3.5 Supply Manifold process diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Humidity Exchanger diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.7 Fault Generator Block (FGB) and Fault Diagnosis System (FDS) implementation diagram 71
4.1 Distinct approximating sets used in the set-membership literature. . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Zonotope scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
xi
xii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Fault detection and isolation (FDI) is a very important area. A Fault is deemed to occur when
the system experiences an abnormal condition, such as a component malfunction. The fun-
damental purpose of an FDI scheme is to generate an alarm (promptly) when a fault, if unde-
tected, could have catastrophic consequences and could incur financial losses and process
time up reduction. Analytic redundancy schemes compare measured out-puts of the system
being monitored with the outputs of a model of the system. Consequently the (faulty) sys-
temmust be modeled in an appropriated way in order for successful diagnosis and isolation
to take place. One approach is to model faults as additive perturbation to an input/output
model of the plant C. et al. (2000). Such a representation is an appropriate way to model
subtle drifts in measuring devices, abrupt sudden failures of sensors, or an actuation devices
becoming struck or failing to respond to a reference command signal.
1.1 Motivation
The energy generation systems based on fuel cells are complex since they involve thermal,
fluidity and electrochemical phenomena. Moreover, they need a set of auxiliary elements
(valves, compressor, sensors, regulators, etc.) to make the fuel cell working at the pre-
established optimal operating point. For these reasons, they are vulnerable to faults that
can cause a emergency shut down or a permanent damage of the fuel cell. To guarantee a
safe operation of the fuel cell systems, it is necessary to use systematic techniques, like the
recentmethods of Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) in Blanke et al. (2003), which allow increasing
the fault tolerance of this technology. The first task to achieve active tolerant control is based
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on the inclusion of a fault diagnosis system operating in real-time. The diagnosis system
should not only allow the fault detection and isolation but also the fault magnitude estima-
tion. In this paper, a LPVmodel based fault diagnosis is proposed as a way to diagnose faults
in fuel cell systems. The model-based fault diagnosis is based on comparing on-line the real
behavior of the monitored system obtained by means of sensors with a predicted behavior
obtained using a LPV dynamic model with an observer scheme. In case of a significant dis-
crepancy (residual) is detected between the model and the measurements obtained by the
sensors, the existence of a fault is assumed. If a set of measurements is available, it is possi-
ble to generate a set of residuals (indicators) that present a different sensitivity to the set of
possible faults. The contributions of this paper are: first, the use of a LPV observer for fault
detection and second, the use of the relative residual fault sensitivity analysis that allows to
isolate faults that otherwise would not be separable.
1.2 Contributions
1.3 Thesis Outline
1.4 Publications and Diffusion
CHAPTER 2
STATE OF ART IN FAULT DIAGNOSIS
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will look into the different approaches described in literature and briefly
describe them. They will also be compared to each other and finally the approaches to be
further investigated in this work will be selected
The fault acting upon a system can be divided into three types of faults, see Figure 2.1.
• Sensor (Instrument) faults.
Fault acting on the sensors.
• Actuator faults.
Fault acting on the actuators.
• Component (system) faults
A fault acting upon the system or the process we wish to diagnose.
A general FDI scheme based on analytical redundancy can be illustrated as in Figure 4.1(b),
and algorithmwith measurements ans control signal as inputs and a fault decision as output
based on the type of fault is illustrated in Figure 4.1(d). If the system to be diagnosed is very
large it can be necessary to include an influence mechanism to complement the isolation
decision that very well can be an AI inference mechanism.
Faults also can be categorized into additive and multiplicative faults, in terms of how
the faults influence the system variables. Additive faults influence the variables additively,
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such as offsets of sensor; while multiplicative faults usually affect the system parameters by
a product factor. Another way of categorizing faults is time-based, namely abrupt and incip-
ient faults. An abrupt fault represents an undesired and sudden change, while an incipient
fault is a fault that causes undesirable drifts away from healthy values and gradually grows
with time.
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(a) Fault placed in aModel
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Model
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output (y)
Model
output (yˆ)
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Figure 2.1: Structure of a diagnosis system.
It is unrealistic to assume that all signals acting upon the process can bemeasured, there-
fore an important property of an algorithm is how it reacts upon these unknown inputs. It
is also unrealistic to assume a perfect model, the modelling error can be seen as unknown
inputs. An algorithm that continue to work satisfactory even when unknown input vary is
called robust. In some of the approaches described later in this chapter.
2.2 Scope of fault detection and fault isolation
As it was mentioned in the introduction, fault detection is the process of generating fault
signals (φ) on the grounds of the process variables (x) in order to detect faults . Thereby, de-
tection algorithms should generate fault signals which ought to contain information about
faults. Themapping of the space of process variables into the space of fault signals as well as
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the evaluation of these signals in order to detect and indicate the fault takes place during the
detection stage. Besides, it should be taken into account that in the diagnostics of processes,
fault detection is automatically performed by a diagnosing computer. On the other hand,
fault isolation is carried out on the basis of fault signals generated by the detection module.
The result of isolation is a diagnosis showing the faults or states of the system. The knowledge
of the relationship that exists between the fault signals and the faults or the technical states
of the system is necessary in order to perform the fault isolation. Thus, a completely reliable
and unequivocal presentation of the existing faults or the definition of the diagnosed sys-
tem state is not always possible due to incomplete and uncertain knowledge of the system,
limited distinguishability of faults or states, uncertainty of fault signals, etc.
In general, fault detection and isolationmethodsmay be classified into twomajor groups
Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003): those which do not utilize the model of the plant or the
process to express the knowledge about its physics and those which do . Regarding the last
group, there are twomainly approaches: the analytical onewhere the process or plant under-
standing is expressed in terms of mathematical functional relationships between the inputs
and outputs of the system and the qualitative one where these relationships are expressed
in terms of qualitative functions. The analytical approach is mainly used by the known FDI
methodology which is based on engineering disciplines as control theory and statistics. Con-
versely, another important methodology is the known as DX which is based on the fields of
computer science and artificial intelligence applying, typically, qualitativemodels. Nonethe-
less, this thesis is not focused on comparing the FDI andDXmethodologies. The techniques
analyzed in this thesis are just classified according to its application (fault detection or fault
isolation). Although this thesis is devoted to themodel-based methods, themodel-free tech-
niques will be briefly reviewed in the following. There are many ways to categorize the dif-
ferent diagnosis schemes described in literature, but here it is divided then into two groups,
Model-free andModel-basedmethods
2.2.1 Model-freemethods
In this approach, the fault detection and isolation methods do not use a model of the plant
and they range from physical redundancy and special sensors through limit-checking and
spectrum analysis to logical reasoning.
• Physical redundancy. In this approach, multiple sensors are installed to measure the
same physical quantity. Any serious discrepancy between themeasurements indicates
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a sensor fault. With only two parallel sensors, fault isolation is not possible. With three
sensors, a voting scheme can be built which allows to isolating the faulty sensor. Phys-
ical redundancy involves extra hardware cost and extra weight, the latter representing
a serious concern, for example, in aerospace applications.
• Special sensors may be installed explicitly for detection and isolation. A sort of these
sensors are the known as limit sensors (measuring e.g., temperature or pressure),
which perform limit checking using additional hardware.
• Limit checking. In this approach, plant measurements are compared by computer to
preset limits. Exceeding the threshold indicates a fault situation.
• Spectrum analysis of plant measurements may also be used for detection and isola-
tion. Most plant variables exhibit a typical frequency spectrum under normal operat-
ing conditions; any deviation from this is an indication of abnormality. Certain types
of faults may even have their characteristic signature in the spectrum, facilitating fault
isolation.
• Logic reasoning techniques form a broad class which is complementary to the meth-
ods outlined above, in that they are aimed at evaluating the fault signals obtained by
the detection hardware or software. The simplest techniques consist of trees of logi-
cal rules of the "IF - fault signal φi - AND fault signal φ j -THEN conclusion" type. Each
conclusion can, in turn, serve as a fault signal in the next rule, until the final conclusion
is reached.
2.2.2 Model-basedmethods
The general idea of fault diagnosis model based methods is to compare the available mea-
surements of the monitored system with their corresponding predictions obtained using a
system model, either analytical or qualitative (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003). If they dif-
fer significantly, then it may be concluded that a fault has occurred. Nonetheless, the prob-
lemwith this approach is that a precise description of a system that takes the effects of faults
into account is usually impossible, and even if such a description exists, the dependence that
characterizes particular faults cannot be defined on the grounds of it. Therefore, different
kinds of simplified models are used in fault detection and isolation. When classifying mod-
els applied to the diagnostics of processes (systems), it is possible to distinguish models of
systems applied to fault detection and models used for fault isolation. Models used for fault
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detection describe relationships existing within the system between the input (u) and out-
put (y) signals, and allow detecting changes (fault signals φ) caused by faults. Models used
for fault isolation define the existing relationship between fault signals φ and faults f, which
will be represented by φ→ f.
Analytical models as well as fuzzy and neural ones are applied to fault detection. These
models usually describe the system in the normal state what allow to calculate residuals re-
flecting divergences that may exist between the observed operation of the system and the
normal operationdefinedby themodel through the computed systempredictions ( yˆ ). These
residuals are most often calculated as differences between the measured and the modelled
output signals. In a non-faulty state, residual values should oscillate around zero. In conse-
quence, residual values different than zero denote fault signals which should allow to detect
and isolate the fault. Conversely, residual values are rarely used for fault isolation. The bi-
nary or multi-value evaluation of residual values is usually applied, and an inference about
faults is carried out on the basis of fault signals which were converted in such a way. Con-
sequently, a classifier is needed for the conversion of residual continuous signals (r) into
quality fault signals
(
φ
(
r→φ)). Models applied to fault isolation should map the space of
fault signals into the space of faults f
(
φ→ f).Thereby, and such as it was for the fault detec-
tion case, these relationships can be defined on the basis of analytical/qualitative modelling,
taking into account the effect of faults, training or using an expert’s knowledge. As it was
pointed out previously, there are twomainly approaches in model-based fault detection and
isolation: the analytical model-based approach which just uses analytical models and the
qualitativemodel-based approach which just applies qualitativemodels of the system plant.
2.3 Fault detection using systemmodels
In general, model-based fault detection methods use system (process) models in order to
generate residuals Himmelblau (1978), Gertler. (1998). Thus, Fig. ?? illustrates the general
and conceptual structure of a model-based fault detection module which consists in two
main parts: the residual generation stage and the residual value stage. This two-stage struc-
ture was first suggested by Chow andWillsky (1984) and now is widely accepted by the fault
diagnosis community. Themain purposes of these twomain stages are described as follows:
• Residual Generation: Its purpose is to generate a fault-indicating signal-residual, us-
ing available input and output information from the monitored system. This auxiliary
8 Chapter 2 : State of art in Fault Diagnosis
System
System
model
yˆ
u
(
u, yˆ
)→ yˆ
−
+
r
Residual
evaluationr→φ
f
Fault
isolation
φ
φ→ f
f
Figure 2.2: Fault diagnosis diagram using systemmodels
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Figure 2.3: Architecture of model-based fault detection using residuals.
signal is designed to reflect the onset of a possible fault in the analyzed system. The
residual should be normally zero or close to zero when no fault is present, but should
be distinguishably different from zero when a fault occurs. This means that the resid-
ual is characteristically independent of system inputs and outputs, in ideal conditions.
The algorithm used to generate residuals is called a residual generator. Residual gen-
eration is thus a procedure for extracting fault signalsφ from the system, with the fault
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signal represented by the residual signal (r). The residual should ideally carry only
fault information and to ensure reliable fault detection, the loss of fault information in
residual generation should be as small as possible.
• Residual value evaluation: Every fault detection algorithm thatmakes use of an analyt-
ical, fuzzy or neural model contains the decision-making part, in which the evaluation
of the residual value takes place. In this stage, the decision about the existence of a
fault is made together with a possible indication of this event generating the corre-
sponding fault signal. This signal should carry information about the effect of the fault
on the residual set so that the fault isolation module can isolate this fault. A decision
process may consist in a simple threshold test on the instantaneous values or mov-
ing averages of the residuals Puig et al. (1999), Ploix et al. (2000), or it may consist of
methods of statistical decision theory, e.g., generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) testing or
sequential probability ratio testing (SPRT) Willsky and Jones (1976), Basseville (1988),
Tzafestas andWatanabe (1990), Basseville and Nikirov (1993). On the other hand, this
residual evaluation can also be carried out with the use of fuzzy or neural logic J. et al.
(1999) or qualitative methods Kuipers (1994), Leicht et al. (1994). The residual eval-
uation related to these approaches allow taking into account the uncertainty of fault
signal values caused by disturbances in the system, measurement noise, modelling er-
rors, and difficulties with the definition of threshold values.
Model-based fault detection is concerned mainly with
• On-line fault diagnosis in which the diagnosis is carried out during system operation.
This is because the system input-output information required by model-based fault
detection module is only available when the system is in operation.
• Robustness against disturbances, noise andmodelling uncertainty that arises from in-
complete knowledge and understanding of the monitored processes. Consequently,
the residual generated to indicate faults may also react to the presence of noise, dis-
turbances and model errors. Desensitizing the residuals to these sources is a most
important aspect in the design of the detection and diagnosis algorithm. In particular:
– To deal with the effects of noise, the residuals may be filtered and statistical tech-
niques may be applied to their evaluation.
– Disturbance decoupling may be built into the design of the residual generator,
but it competes with isolation enhancement for the available design freedom.
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– Robustness in the face of modelling errors is the most fundamental problem in
model-based fault detection and isolation. Several methods are available which
usually rely on some sort of optimization: the known techniques are effective only
under limited circumstances.
Because of the presence of noise and model errors, the residuals are never zero, even
if there is no fault. Therefore, the residual evaluation requires testing the residuals against
thresholds, obtained empirically or by theoretical considerations. As it was already men-
tioned, another approach to achieve residual evaluation robustness would be the use of a
fuzzy or neural logic. On the other hand, to facilitate fault isolation, the residual generators
are usually designed (enhanced residuals) exhibiting structural or directional properties. The
isolation decisions then can be obtained in a structural (Boolean) or directional (geometric)
framework, with or without the inclusion of statistical elements. Concerning residual gen-
erationmethods in model-based fault detection and isolation, four main approaches can be
considered within the group of analytical methods applied to fault detection. In the next
lines, few ideas about those methods are given:
• Diagnostic Observers. The basic idea behind the diagnostic observer approaches is
to estimate the outputs of the system from the measurements (or a subset of mea-
surements) by using either Luenberger observers in a deterministic setting Beard
(1979), Jones (1973) or Kalman filters in a stochastic settingMehra and Peschon (1971),
Willsky and Jones (1976), Basseville and Benvenista (1986). Then, the weighted output
estimation error is used as a residual. Thereby, while the flexibility in selecting the ob-
server gains is used to minimize the noise effect on the fault detection result in the
Kalman approach, this freedom is applied to enhance the residual fault detection and
isolation properties in the Luenberger approach. As a result, the dynamics of the fault
response can be controlled, within certain limits, by placing the poles of the observer.
This trendwas followed by a long line of researchers, including Frank and Keller (1981),
M. (1990), Viswanadham and Srichander (1987), Patton et al. (1989), Chen and Patton
(1999), Puig et al. (2003a).
• Parity (consistency) relations. Parity relations are rearranged direct input-output
model equations, subjected to a linear dynamic transformation. The transformed
residuals serve for detection and isolation. The residual sequence is coloured, just
like in the case of observers. The design freedom provided by the transformation
can be used for disturbance decoupling and fault isolation enhancement. Also, the
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dynamics of the response can be assigned, within the limits posed by the require-
ments of casualty and stability. The parity relation approach to generate the resid-
ual, based upon consistency checking on system input and output data over a time
window, was originally proposed by Mironovski (1979, 1980). The approach was later
proposed by Chow andWillsky (1984), and has been expressed in several different ver-
sions: Gertler. (1998), Chen and Zhang (1990),. The latest development regarding par-
ity relation approaches can be found inGertler (1997), Gertler. (1998), Chen and Patton
(1999), Ploix and Adrot (2006).
• Parameter estimation. Another FDI approach is the use of parameter estimation
which is based directly on system identification techniques. In 1984, Isermann illus-
trated that process fault detection and isolation can be achieved using the estima-
tion of non-measurable process parameters and/or state variables in his survey pa-
per Isermann (1984). Parameter estimation is a natural approach to the detection and
isolation of parametric (multiplicative) faults. A reference model is obtained by first
identifying the plant in fault-free situation. Then, the parameters are repeatedly re-
identified on-line. Deviations from the reference model serve as a basis for detection
and isolation. Parameter estimation may be more reliable than the analytical redun-
dancymethods, but it is alsomore demanding in terms of on-line computation and in-
put excitation requirements and consequently, this approach will not be considered in
the thesis. The latest development and applications can be found in Isermann (1997),
R. (2005), Ingimundarson et al. (2005b,a) .
2.3.1 Analytical model-based fault detection techniques
These techniques uses a mathematical model of the monitored system in order to estimate
the system outputs. Comparing these estimations (yˆk), with the real system output, (yk )
(Residual generation stage), a set of residuals, (rk), is obtained. Then, analyzing this resid-
ual set, a decision about the existence of a fault, ( fk ) is made (Residual value evaluation or
Decision Making stage) generating the corresponding fault signals (φk ) in case the residual
evaluation determines a fault is affecting themonitored system.
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Residual generation and evaluation
Asmentioned above, analyticalmodel-based fault detection is based on generating a residual
comparing the measurements of physical variables y(k) of the process with their estimation
yˆk provided by the associated systemmodel:
rk = yk − yˆk (2.1)
Thereby, residuals, (rk), will be generated at every time instant k by the residual genera-
tor. According to Gertler. (1998), a residual generator is a linear discrete dynamic algorithm
operating on the plant observables, that is, on the command values of the controlled inputs
and on themeasured values of the measured inputs and outputs. Its generic form is
rk =V
(
q−1
)
uk +O
(
q−1
)
yk (2.2)
where, rk is the vector of residuals, V
(
q−1
)
are transfer function matrices. However, this
equation is not necessarily a residual generator; it has to return zero-valued residuals when
there are no faults, no nuisance inputs and nomodelling errors. Thereby, considering a linear
discrete dynamic system, its nominal input-output relationship (without faults, disturbances
and noise) is set by
yk =M
(
q−1
)
uk (2.3)
Then, when there are no faults, no nuisance inputs and no modelling errors, the Eq. (2.3)
must be satisfied and a proper residual generator must return zero-valued residuals. In con-
sequence
V
(
q−1
)
uk +O
(
q−1
)
M
(
q−1
)
uk (2.4)
has to be fulfilled for all uk , requiring
V
(
q−1
)=−O(q−1)M(q−1) (2.5)
Then, using Eq. (2.2), it is possible to obtain the computational form of the generic residual
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Gertler. (1998). Figure ?? shows the diagram of generic residual generator in computational
form.
rk =O
(
q−1
)[
yk−)M
(
q−1
)
uk
]
(2.6)
System
Model
O
(
q−1
)uk
yˆk
rk
yk
+
−
Figure 2.4: Architecture of Generic residual generator: computational form.
Conversely, it should be noticed that the term of Eq. (2.6) is due to the effect of faults and
nuisance inputs.
δk = yk −M(q−1)uk (2.7)
In consequence, the generic form of the residual generator can be also written in terms
of these effects resulting in internal or unknown-input-effect form Gertler. (1998).
rk =O(q−1)δk (2.8)
In an ideal situation, where the monitored system may only be affected by known faults
and the estimations of the model have no errors regarding the behaviour of the system in a
non-faulty scenario, the residual value evaluation stage will be able to indicate a fault affect-
ing to themonitored systemwhile the residual generator computes nonzero valued residuals
at every time instant. In short, while residual is zero, rk = 0, a fault will not be detected. Oth-
erwise, the residual value evaluation stage will generate the corresponding fault signals (φk )
so that the fault isolation module can diagnose the detected fault
Beingmore realistic, the residual rk will never be zero-valued since themonitored system
is affected by nuisance inputs which can not be either controlled or avoided and further-
more, the system model does have errors regarding the system performance. Consequently,
the condition rk = 0 is used to determine the existence of a fault, the fault detection mod-
ule could indicate faults which do not actually exist. In fault detection and isolation, robust
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residual generatorsmust be usedwhich do only react in presence of faults and do not in pres-
ence of nuisance inputs or because of modelling errors affecting to the considered model. At
the moment, residual generator robustness is the most important aspect when designing a
fault detection and isolation algorithm and it is still an open investigation field.
As it can be inferred from Eq. (2.1), the residual generation stage does depend on the
model type used to estimate the system output since this stage requires this estimation so
that the residual can be generated. In general, different model types will provide different
estimations at every time instant, k . In consequence, the residual value evaluation stage is
also affected by the model type. The reason is that this stage is based on checking if rk = 0
holds or not, assuming an ideal situation. As a result of the two previous statements, it is
concluded that the whole fault detection performance of the fault diagnostic system does
depend on the type of analytical model used to estimate the system output
Conversely, as indicated by the residual computational form given by Eq.(2.6), the time
evolution of the computed residual does strongly depend on the transfer function O
(
q−1
)
and consequently, if this function were properly designed, the fault detection performance
could be improved in order to achieve a better fault indication and to generate a sequence
of fault signals O
(
q−1
)
which allow to isolate the fault easily. Moreover, it must be taken into
account that O
(
q−1
)
has an influence on the residual generator structure and therefore, on
the fault signalswhich can be observedwhen a given fault occurs. In thisway, a proper design
of this function can addmore fault distinguishability in order to improve the reliability of the
result given by the diagnostic system. In the following, it will be shown that this function is
determined by the used systemmodel.
2.3.2 Residual generation using observers
In general, in model-based fault detection, the system model can be used in three different
approaches, in simulation, in prediction and in observation:
• Simulation approach. This is an open loop approach and the real measurements are
not used to correct the estimation given by themodel.
• Prediction approach. This is a closed loop approach and the system output measure-
ment, yk , will be used to correct the estimation given by themodel.
• Observation approach. This is a semi-closed loop where the system output, yk , will be
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partially used in order to correct the estimation given by themodel in simulation.
According to Gertler (1997), the simulation and prediction approaches (parity equation
approach) can be seen as two particular cases of the observation approach for two specific
values of the observer gain. Thus, in this thesis, the observer approach will be considered.
Moreover, concerning the residual generation stage, Gertler. (1998) shows the equivalence
between the observer approach and the parity equations (simulation and prediction ap-
proach) in relation to the structure of the obtained residual generator and consequently, a
fault detection analysis of the observer performance will also allow to obtain information
about the performance of predictors and simulators when particularizing the observation
gain matrix for the two values used for these two approaches. Assuming that the system is
completely observable, the general expression of a linear discrete-time observer in its state-
space form is given by
xˆk+1 = Axˆk +Buk +L
(
yk − yˆk
)
yˆk = C xˆk +Duk (2.9)
where yk ∈ Rny , uk ∈ Rnu , xk ∈ Rnx are the system output, input and the state-space vec-
tors respectively; yˆk ∈Rny and xˆk ∈Rnx are the estimated system output and state-space vec-
tors respectively; A, B ,C andD are the state, the input and the output matrices respectively;
L is the observer gain matrix designed to stabilize the observer and to guarantee a desired
performance regarding fault detection. It must be noticed that two extreme cases can be
considered in the observer definition. First, the observer becomes a simulator using L = 0
and as a consequence, its eigenvalues are equal to the ones of the considered system (L = 0)
(Chowet al, 1984) , but it can only beusedwhen the system is stable. Second, the observer be-
comes a predictor Chow andWillsky (1984) when the observer gain ( L = Lp ) is selected such
that all the observer eigenvalues are at the origin (deadbeat observer ) Isermann and Chen
(1991). Moreover, the observer model has the capability of placing its eigenvalues between
these two extreme cases using a set of observation gains (L = L0) which are different from the
ones mentioned previously. Regarding the simulation and prediction cases, Gertler (1997)
sets that they correspond to the well-known parity equations and they are embedded in the
observer Eq. (2.9).
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In the following, the goal is to obtain the expression of the residual computational form,
see Eq. (2.6), when an observer model is used in order to obtain the transfer functionO
(
q−1
)
since, as mentioned above, this function rules the most of the fault detection and isolation
properties of the considered fault diagnosis model. Thereby, in order to obtain this result
some transformations of the interval observer state-space formmust be done. Thus, consid-
ering the residual expression given by Eq. (2.1) and taking into account that the residual, rk ,
can be seen as an extramodel input, the observer state-space form can be rearranged as
xˆk+1 = Axˆk +
[
B L
]⎡⎣ uk
rk
⎤
⎦
yˆk = C xˆk +Duk (2.10)
Then, assuming zero initial conditions, the input-output form of the observer using the
q−transform is
yˆk =C
(
qI − A)−1Buk +C (qI − A)−1Lrk (2.11)
Thus, defining yˆk ,L=0 y as the value of yˆk when L = 0 (simulation value) and Hr
(
q−1
)
as
Hr
(
q−1
)=C (q−1I − A)−1L (2.12)
the interval observer input-output form can bewritten as the sumof the estimation given
by the simulation approach (L = 0) and a termwhich depends on the residual rk :
yˆk = yˆk ,L=0+Hr
(
q−1
)
rk (2.13)
Thus, it must be noticed that thenormof the steady-sate value ofHr
(
q−1
)
is proportional
to the norm of the observation gain L. Conversely, taking into account that the general ex-
pression of the residual is given by Eq. (2.1) and using the observer output estimation given
by Eq. (2.13), the residual can be re-written as
rk = yk − yˆ
= yk − yˆk ,L=0+Hr
(
q−1
)
rk (2.14)
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Then, grouping the terms associated with the residual to the left side of the equation,
(
I +Hr
(
q−1
))= yk − yˆk ,L=0 (2.15)
Examining the right-sided term of this equation and considering the definition of the
residual, see Eq. (2.1), it must be seen that this term corresponds to the residual generated
by the simulation approach which can be written down as rk ,L=0. Thus, taking into account
that Hr
(
q−1
)
is a square matrix and considering
(
I +Hr
(
q−1
))−1
has a inverse matrix, this
equation can be expressed as
rk =
(
I +Hr
(
q−1
))−1
rk ,L=0 (2.16)
This equation sets the relation between the residual related to the simulation approach
and the residual generated by an observer. As seen, this relation is ruled by a transfer func-
tion which depends on the observer gain L. As a consequence, it can be said that the fault
detection and isolation properties of the considered analytical model are determined by L.
Comparing the residual computational form given by Eq.(2.16) with the residual form
Eq.(2.16), the expression of the transfer function O
(
q−1
)
for the general case of an observer
can be derived:
O
(
q−1
) = (I +Hr (q−1))
=
(
I +C (qI − A)−1L)−1 (2.17)
then
yk −M
(
q−1
)
uk = rk ,L=0
= yk − yˆk ,L=0
= yk −C
(
qI − A)−1Buk (2.18)
Then, considering in simulation (L = 0), the residual in computational form is
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rk ,L=0 = yk −C
(
qI − A)−1Buk (2.19)
In prediction (L = Lp), the residual in computational form is
rk ,L=Lp =
(
I +C (qI − A)−1Lp)−1 [yk −C (qI − A)−1Buk] (2.20)
as observer case (L = Lo), the residual in computational form is
rk ,L=Lo =
(
I +C (qI − A)−1Lo)−1[yk −C (qI − A)−1Buk] (2.21)
Such as it can be seen in Eq. (2.19) and (2.20), when considering the simulation or pre-
diction approach, the structure of the residual generator is fully established and as a result,
so does its fault detection and isolation performance.
2.4 Robustness issues
Mathematical models building from a complex systems, there is always amismatch between
the modelled and real behaviour since some effects are neglected, some parameters have
tolerance, some errors in parameters or in the structure of the model are introduced in the
calibration process, etc. Many times, thesemodelling errors could be bounded and included
in the fault detection model. There are several ways of modelling the uncertainty associated
with the model. For instance, an approach providing a nominal model plus the uncertainty
on every parameter bounded by intervals determines what is known as interval model ap-
proach (or worst-case model approach). In the FDI and automatic control community, this
type of uncertainty is called structured because it is assumed that the structure of the model
is known but not the model parameters, in opposition to a more general type of uncertainty
which considers the structure of the model is not completely known but only bounded. This
type of uncertainty is known as unstructured. In FDI community a fault detection algorithm
able to handle uncertainty is called robust. The robustness of fault detection algorithm is
the degree of sensitivity to faults compared to the degree of sensitivity to uncertainty Patton
(1994). Research on robust fault detection methods has been very active in the FDI com-
munity these last years Chen and Patton (1999). One family of approaches, called active, is
based on generating residuals which are insensitive to uncertainty, while at the same time
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sensitive to faults. This approach has been extensively developed these last years for several
researchers using different techniques: unknown input observers, robust parity equations,
H∞, etc. In Chen and Patton (1999) there is an excellent survey of the active approach. On
the other hand, there is a second family of approaches, called passive, which enhances the
robustness of the fault detection system at the residual value evaluation stage. This approach
is still under research. Several techniques have been used, butmost of them are based on us-
ing an adaptive threshold at the residual value evaluation stage. According to Gertler. (1998),
there is no algorithm which is robust under arbitrary model error conditions. To design an
algorithm for robustness, rather detailed information is necessary about the nature of errors
and uncertainties, and such information is seldom available. But even if it is, what can be
achieved is rather limited. Generally perfect decoupling of the residuals from uncertainties
it is only possible in a limited number of model parameters. Adaptive thresholdign tech-
niques were first proposed by R.N. (1989), who suggests an empirical relation between the
operation point and the corresponding detection threshold. Further approaches are due to
A et al. (1988), who develops a theoretical relation between the operation point, the model
uncertainty and the detection threshold. This approach is based on H∞ techniques and it
was further explored by Frank (1991) and X. and P.M. (1991). Another approach for adap-
tive threshold generation was proposed by Horak and Guidance (1988) and it is based on
a dynamical optimization assuming parametric uncertainty. The passive approach has the
advantage over the corresponding active approach that it can achieve robustness in the de-
tection procedure in spite of the number of uncertain parameters in themodel, and without
using any approximation based on the simplification of the underlying parameter represen-
tation. The passive approach based on adaptive thresholds is based not in avoiding the effect
of uncertainty in the residual through perfect decoupling, but in propagating the parameter
uncertainty to the residual, and then bounding the residual uncertainty using an interval.
2.4.1 Passive robust approach
This thesis focuses on the adaptive thresholding passive robustness approach using interval
models for fault detection process. The use of this type ofmodels has received several names
depending on the field of research: in circuit analysis is known as worst-case or tolerance
analysis, in automatic control as set-membership, bounding approach or robust.
The problem of adaptive threshold generation in discrete time-domain using interval
models can be formulated mathematically as the need of computing at every time instant
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a system output estimation using an interval
[
yˆk
]
. This interval does only have to wrap the
system output when this system is not affected by any fault. Therefore, while the system
output interval estimation contains the system output, none fault will be indicated.
yk ∈
[
yˆk
]
(2.22)
In general, this approach compares the systemoutput yk with its interval estimation
[
yˆk
]
,
provided by the interval model, computing at every time instant the interval residual [rk ] as
[rˆk ]= yk − yˆ (2.23)
Then, derived from Eq.(2.22) and Eq.(2.23), the residual value evaluation stage does not indi-
cate any fault while holds.
0 ∈ [rk ] (2.24)
Thereby, it can be said that the fault detection test is based on propagating the model
uncertainty to the residual set Puig et al. (2002b) and checking the value of the resultant in-
terval residual according to Eq. (2.24). While the interval residual satisfies Eq. (2.24), no fault
can be indicated since the residual value can be due to themodel uncertainty. Of course, this
approach has the drawback that those faults producing a residual deviation smaller than the
residual uncertainty will be missed (non-detectable faults).
When considering a discrete linear time-invariant interval model, there are two main
approaches to calculate the system output estimation interval at every time instant: the set-
based and the trajectory-based approaches. In thenext section, these twomethodologies are
described describing different algorithms for each family and pointing out their drawbacks
and strengths.
Interval observation using set and trajectory-based approaches
As mentioned in the previous section, passive robust fault detection based on intervals ob-
servers needs to compute at every time instant a system output estimation interval
[
yˆk
]
which is used to obtain the residual interval [rk ], Eq. (2.23) required by the residual value
evaluation stage in order to indicate or not the presence of a fault Eq. (2.24) and to generate
the corresponding fault signals. Thereby, when considering a discrete linear time-invariant
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interval model like the interval observer given by Eq. (2.9), there are twomain approaches to
calculate the systemoutput interval estimation at every time instant: the set-based (or region-
based) approach and the trajectory-based approach. In this section, these two methodolo-
gies are described showing different algorithms for each family and pointing out the draw-
backs and strengths of both approaches.
In general, the exact set produced by an interval observer, see Eq. (2.9), of the characteris-
tics mentioned previously will require a big effort in order to be calculated using a computer
Adrot and Flaus (2003) and normally, it is approximated by, for example, a box, a polytope or
an ellipsoid. Then, this type of simulation or state observation is known as set membership
but when the calculated set is the interval hull of the exact set, then, it is called interval sim-
ulation or state observation Puig et al. (2005b). In the literature, algorithms can be classified
according to if they compute the approximate set of estimated states using one step-ahead
iteration based on previous approximate sets (set-based approaches)Adrot and Flaus (2003),
V. et al. (2001), or a set of point-wise trajectories generated by selecting particular values of
the observer interval parameter vector ϕ using heuristics or optimization (trajectory-based
approaches) Puig et al. (2002a, 2003b), Tibken and Hofer (1993). In the first case, the set of
states xk is approximated at each iteration and some propagation algorithm is used to pro-
duce the approximate set of states xk+1. This approach is affected by several problems (spe-
cially, in case that the approximate set is the interval hull): wrapping effect, range evaluation
of an interval function (in this case, the state-space function) and the uncertain parameter
time dependency. However, in the second case, the interval hull of xk is built following real
trajectories generated by selecting particular values of ϑ. Consequently, this approach over-
comes the wrapping effect and preserves the uncertain parameter time dependency, but the
problem of the interval function (in this case the trajectory function range evaluation still re-
mains. On the other hand, set-based approaches present a lower computationally complex-
ity than trajectory-based approaches do and consequently, they seems to be more suitable
for real-time applications.
Interval observation According to Puig et al. (2005a), the interval observation problem re-
garding the computation of the system output estimation interval can be established in the
same way than the interval simulation problem presented in Puig et al. (2003b). This can be
done since an interval observer can be seen as an interval simulator with two inputs: uk and
yk . Thus, considering this point of view and the observer Eq. (2.9), the interval observer can
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be reorganized as
xˆk+1 = Ao(ϑ)xˆk +Bo(ϑ)uˆok
yˆk = C (ϑ)xˆk +D(ϑ)uˆok (2.25)
where Ao(ϑ)= A(ϑ)−LC (ϑ) is the state-space observer matrix, Bo(ϑ)= [B (ϑ)L] is the re-
sultant input matrix, uˆok =
[
uk yk
]−1
, the resultant input and ϑ ∈Φ is a set of time-invariant
model parameters bounded by an interval set Θ=
{
ϑ ∈Rnϑ ∣∣ϑi ≤ϑi ≤ ϑi , i = 1, . . . ,nϑ} which
represents the uncertainty about the exact knowledge of real system parameters. In con-
sequence, derived from the interval observer structure shown by Eq. (2.25), the observer
gain matrix L must be designed to stabilize matrix Ao instead of matrix A and to guar-
antee a desired performance regarding fault detection for all ϑ ∈ Φ , as mentioned pre-
viously. In line with Puig et al. (2005a), the solution set of a system which can be de-
scribed by the interval observer, Eq. (2.25) for the time interval [0,N ] consists of Xˆ(0,N ) ={
xˆ
(
k ,u,y, xˆo,ϑ
)
: k ∈ [0,N ] ,ϑ ∈Θ, xˆo ∈ Xˆo
}
, where xˆ
(
k ,u,y, xˆo,ϑ
)
denotes the solution of Eq.
(2.25) at time k for some parameter vector ϑ ∈ Θ and some initial condition xˆo = Xˆo at time
k = 0. The set of values for a certain time instant k will be referred as the reachability set and
denoted by
xˆ= {xˆ(k ,u,y, xˆo,ϑ) :ϑ ∈Θ, xˆo ∈ Xˆo} (2.26)
Thus, given the observer gain matrix L guaranties the model stability for all ϑ ∈ Θ the
reachability set Xˆwill be bounded by region for each k ∈ [0,∞).
Then, the interval observation problem consists in computing the interval hull of the
reachability set Xˆ, i.e., the smallest interval vector containing it: Xˆ ⊆ Xˆ, where  is used to
denote the interval hull of Xˆ, for all k ∈ [0,N ]. The sequence of interval vectors Xˆk with
k ∈ [0,N ] will be called the interval solution (or envelopes) of the interval observer.
Interval observation drawbacks When the interval observation approach is used in fault
detection and isolation, several drawbacks must be taken into account. In general, they a
related to the type of algorithm applied to compute at every time instant the system output
estimation interval and the corresponding residual. In the following, these drawbacks are
described analyzing how they can be avoided tuning properly the interval observer model.
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Wrapping effect The wrapping problem is related to the use of a crude approximation of
the interval observer solution set and its iteration using one-step ahead recursion of
the state-space observer function, i.e, a region based approach. This problem does
not appear when the estimated trajectory function xˆ(k ,u,y,ϑ) , i.e., a trajectory based
approach, is used. On the other hand, when using the one-step ahead recursion ap-
proach, at each iteration, the true solution set Xˆk is wrapped into a superset feasible
to construct and to represent the real region on a computer. Since the overestimation
of the wrapped set is proportional to its radius, a spurious growth of the enclosures
can result if the composition of wrapping and mapping is iterated (Kuhn1998). The
wrapping effect can be completely unrelated to the stability characteristics of the ob-
server, and even stable observers could exhibit exponentially fast growing envelopes
which are useless for practical purposes. Not all the interval observers are affected by
this problem. It has been shown that those that aremonotone with respect to states do
not present this problem. These kinds of observers (systems) are known as isotonic
Cugueró et al. (2002) or cooperative Gouzé et al. (2000). In case of observers whose
state function is a contractive mapping (see Definition 2.2), the overestimation of the
wrapped set does not increase along the time Puig et al. (2003a).
Definition 2.1. Isotonicity property: A discrete-time system satisfies the isotonicity
property if the variation of the state function respects all the states and parameters
is positive Cugueró et al. (2002).
Definition 2.2. Contractivity property:A function f :Rn →Rn is a contractionmapping
if there is a number s, with 0 < s < 1, so that for any vectors x and y it is satisfied that
d
(
f (x), f (y)
) ≤ s (x,y) where d (x,y) is the diameter function and s is the contractivity.
When linear functions of the type f = Ax are considered, ‖A‖∞ = s.
According to the isotonicity and contractivity characteristics defined previously, a sta-
ble (ρ (A)< 1 where ρ (A) is the spectral radius1 ) interval discrete-time system can be
classified as
• Isotonic systems: When the isotonicity property is achieved or in other words, all
A(ϑ) matrix elements are positive. In this case, region and trajectory based algo-
rithms obtain the same estimation of states.
• Non-isotonic but contractive systems: Although isotonicity is not achieved, the
state matrix is a contractive mapping, ‖A‖∞ < 1, and consequently, the state esti-
mation suffers fromwrapping effect when the region based approach is used but
1The spectral radius of a given matrix is themaximum absolute value of all the eigenvalues of this matrix.
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because of the contractivity property, the state overestimation does not increase
in time: stable wrapping effect.
• Non-isotonic and non-contractive systems: In spite of the system stability, the
state estimationwhenusing regionbased approach is unstable and consequently,
a fast growing of the enclosures appears. In this case, trajectory based approach
must be used, in spite of its high complexity.
Temporal variance on uncertain parameters An additional issue should be taken into ac-
count when an interval observer is used: uncertain parameter time invariance is not
naturally preserved using one-step ahead recursion algorithms. If one-step recursion
scheme is used El Ghauoui and Calafiore (2000), the system state set, Xk+1, is approxi-
mated by a set computed using a previous set which is an approximation of the system
state region Xk and using the uncertain parameter set Θ. Then, the relation between
parameters and states is not preserved since every parameter contained in the param-
eter uncertainty region Θ is combined with every state of the Xk approximation set
when determining the approximation set of Xk+1. Thus, recursive schemes based on
one-step are intrinsically time varying. Parameter time-invariance can only be guar-
anteed if the relation between parameters and states is preserved at every time instant.
One possibility to preserve this dependence is to derive a functional relation between
states and parameters at every time instant that will transport the system from the
initial state to the present state. Two approaches about the assumption of the time-
variance of the uncertain parameters are possible:
• time-varying approach which assumes that uncertain parameters are unknown
but bounded in their uncertainty intervals and can vary at each time step since
one-step ahead recursion algorithms are used. This is the approach followed by
El Ghauoui and Calafiore (2000) and V. et al. (2001), among others
• time-invariant approachwhich assumes that uncertain parameters are unknown
but bounded in their uncertainty intervals and guarantee that they can not vary
at each time step since a functional relation between parameters and states is
used instead of a one-step ahead recursion. This is the approach followed by
Tibken and Hofer (1993), Horak and Guidance (1988), Puig et al. (1999) among
others.
Although the set-based (region-based) algorithmsbelong to the time-varying approach,
the parameter and state relation is preserved at every time instant when monitoring
an isotonic system. This statement is guaranteed by the interval arithmetic. Then,
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if a system is not isotonic, an isotonic observer might be used in order to avoid this
problem and thereby, the system output interval estimation could be computed using
a set-based approach which has a low computational complexity.
Range evaluation of an interval function When predicting the behaviour of a dynamic sys-
temwith an interval observer, the need to evaluate the interval hull of the system state
interval estimation at each time step implies the computation of the range of an in-
terval function. Many approaches to interval observation need to evaluate the range
of an interval function at every time instant in order to determine the system state in-
terval estimation. One possibility for evaluating this range is to apply directly interval
arithmetic substituting operations between real numbers by operations between in-
tervals Moore (1966). But, although the ranges of basic interval arithmetic operations
are exactly the ranges of the corresponding real operations, this is not the case if the
operations are composed since multi instances of the same variable are not taken into
account. For instance: allow to us consider x ∈ [−1,1], then the interval for z = x − x
should be 0, but when applying interval arithmetic it is [−2,2] . This phenomenon is
termed as interval dependence or multi-incidence problem Moore (1966). One possi-
bility to avoid this problem is to combine the use of interval arithmetic with a branch
and bound algorithm Hansen (1992). Another possibility to evaluate the range of an
interval function is to solve two optimization problems (a minimization and a maxi-
mization) using numerical methods. But, classical numerical optimization algorithms
can only guarantee local optimums since they are gradient based. Global optimums
canonly be obtained if the optimizationproblemsassociatedwith the range evaluation
are convex Bazaraa et al. (1993). However, in general, to guarantee global optimums in
non-convex optimization problems, global optimization algorithms based on branch
and bound should be used Puig et al. (1999). Lastly, derived from the interval arith-
metic properties, this problem only has an effect on those non-isotonic models which
are computed using a set-based algorithm. As analyzed above, when computing iso-
tonicmodels using a set based approach, the relation between parameters and states is
preserved and consequently, this interval function range evaluation problem also van-
ishes. Then, when themonitored system is not isotonic, the use of an isotonic observer
allows avoiding the range evaluation problem in spite of using the set-based approach.
Set based approaches to interval observation One of the first approaches to compute a
estimation of the system state region Xk+1 using a set-basedmethodwas set byMoore (1966).
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This algorithm, when applied to a linear discrete-time intervalmodel as Eq. (2.25), computes
the system state interval estimation [xˆk+1] at time instant k +1 using as initial condition the
system state interval estimation [xˆk ] at time instant k . It is based on computing the natural
interval extension of the state-space function by replacing each occurrence of xˆk and ϑ by
its corresponding interval and each standard function by its interval evaluation (absolute
algorithm) Moore (1966):
[xˆk+1]= Ao ([ϑ]) [xˆk ]+Bo ([ϑ])uok (2.27)
However, replacing real numbers in a function by intervals often leads to large overes-
timations that derive in a system state interval estimation [xˆk+1] which always increases its
value, even if the true solution contracts. A better approach is to apply the interval mean-
value theoremMoore (1966) to Eq.(2.27) (relative algorithm):
[xˆk+1]= xˆck+1+ Ao ([ϑ]) [xˆk − xˆck ] (2.28)
where
xˆck+1 = Ao
(
ϑˆ
)
xˆck +Bo
(
ϑˆ
)
uok (2.29)
with xˆck+1, xˆck and ϑˆ being the mid-points of the intervals [xˆk+1], [xˆk ] and [ϑ].
However, this method suffers from the wrapping effect when the observer matrix Ao is
not isotonic or thismatrix is ill-conditioned, as for example, those oneswith eigenvalueswith
very different magnitudes. Otherwise, when the observer matrix Ao is isotonic, the Moore’s
absolute algorithm can be used to calculate the system state interval estimation avoiding the
mentioned overestimations what results in a very low demanding computational method.
Trajectory based approaches to interval observation Concerning the trajectory-based ap-
proach used to compute a estimation of the system state region Xk+1, a suitable method
is given by Puig et al. (2002a). This method sets that the observer state region Xˆk+1 will be
bounded at any time instant, k , by its interval hullXˆk =
[
xˆk xˆk
]
where
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xˆk = max
[
Ako (ϑ) xˆ (0)+
k−1∑
v=0
Ak−1−vo (ϑ)Bo (ϑ)uo (v)
]
xˆk = min
[
Ako (ϑ) xˆ (0)+
k−1∑
v=0
Ak−1−vo (ϑ)Bo (ϑ)uo (v)
]
(2.30)
subject to ϑ ∈Θ and xˆo ∈ Xˆo ,assuming time-invariant uncertain parameters: this method
is known as a time invariant approach. At the same time that time invariance is preserved,
the wrapping effect is avoided due to the fact that uncertainty is not propagated from step to
step but from the initial state. This approach yields the accurate time-invariant worst-case
observation without any conservatism, assuming that the previous optimization problems
could be solved with infinite precision and the global optimum could be determined. How-
ever, in practice it only could be solved with a given precision. On the other hand, one of
the main drawbacks of this approach, besides its high computational complexity, is that the
objective function is a polynomial with degree increasing by one at each iteration. As a re-
sult, the amount of needed computation increases with time being impossible to operate
over a large time interval. Consequently, some kind of approximation should be introduced
to make the approach more tractable. If the observer given by Eq. (2.25) is asymptotically
stable, any transients settle to negligible values in a finite-time, more precisely in ts/Ts sam-
ples, being ts the observer settling time and Ts the sampling time. This assumption implies
that the outputs of the observer at time k depend only on the inputs that occurred during the
last ts/Ts samples. Therefore, for any time k , it is possible to approximate algorithm given
by Eq. (2.30) using a sliding window of length λ determined by the order of the settling time
measured in number of samples Puig et al. (2003b), subject to: ϑ ∈Θ and xˆk−λ ∈Xˆk−λ.
xˆk = max
[
Ako (ϑ) xˆ (k −λ)+
k−1∑
v=k−λ
Ak−1−vo (ϑ)Bo (ϑ)uo (v)
]
xˆk = min
[
Ako (ϑ) xˆ (k −λ)+
k−1∑
v=k−λ
Ak−1−vo (ϑ)Bo (ϑ)uo (v)
]
(2.31)
this approximation parameter time-invariance is only guaranteed inside the sliding win-
dow. This is why this approach is called almost time-invariant Puig et al. (2002a).
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Another trajectory-based approach is the proposed by Kolev (1993). This method sug-
gests an algorithm that provides an inner solution for the interval observation problem by
solving the optimization problems given by Eq. (2.31) involved in the previous algorithm but
subject to: ϑ ∈ V (Θ) and xˆo ∈ V
(
Xˆo
)
where: ϑ ∈V (Θ) and xˆo ∈ V
(
Xˆo
)
denotes the set of ver-
tices of the uncertain parameters and initial states sets, respectively. Thus, this algorithm
is also known as a vertices algorithm. According to Nickel Nickel (1985), the inner solution
coincides with the interval hull of the solution set for some systems: those unaffected by the
wrapping effect that verify their state function is isotonic with respect to all state variables
Cugueró et al. (2002). For such systems, set and trajectory-based approaches will provide the
same results.
Fault detection problems using interval observers the residual generator (Eq. (2.25)) ob-
tained using an interval observer approach can have appealing fault detection properties if
the observer matrix L is designed properly. This fact is due to the influence of L on the trans-
fer function O
(
q−1
)
, such as it is seen in Eq. (2.17), which sets the model fault detection and
fault isolation properties, according to Gertler. (1998). Conversely, when an interval observer
is used to detect and isolate faults, it is known that there are some problems which can affect
negatively its performance. Those problems related to the computation at every time in-
stant k of the system state estimation interval can be referred as a computational complexity
problem.
Moreover, interval observation, understood as a general approach which contains both
prediction and simulation, also suffers from other kind of problems whose nature affects
directly to the quality of fault indication given by the observer:
• Modelling error and initial condition sensitivity. The simulation approach is very sen-
sitive to the non modelled dynamics and the unknown initial conditions. As a result, it
tends to diverge very easily, especially if the monitored system contains integrators.
Nevertheless, observers and predictors avoid this problem using the system output
measurement to correct their estimations.
• Following fault effect. This problem appears when the model can not persistently in-
dicate a fault and it is due to the use of the system output measurement to correct
the model system output estimation. In this case, the model system output estima-
tion tends to follow the system output and consequently, the Eq. (2.22) and (2.23) can
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be satisfied in spite of the fault existence and as a result, the residual value evalua-
tion stage can no longer indicate the fault. This problem is only avoided when using
the simulation approach. However, observers can partially control this effect using
a proper observer gain matrix L. Conversely, predictors are deeply affected because
they use the whole system output measurement and its fault indication can only last a
number of time instants equal to its order.
• Noise sensitivity. The prediction approach is very sensitive to noise because it substi-
tutes the estimation of the system state by its measurement. Conversely, the obser-
vation approach is less noise sensitive because its system state estimation is partially
corrected using the system output measurement and this correction is controlled by
the value of the observer gain matrix L. Finally, the simulation approach is the most
insensitive of the three approaches to the noise effect because no correction of the esti-
mated state is introduced. To deal with noise, approaches based on statistical tests can
be used, as in the case of the classical fault detectionmethodologies based on numbers
instead of intervals. Basseville and Nikirov (1993). Another approach to deal with noise
can be designing properly the observer gain matrix such as suggested by the Kalman
filter method.
In practice, concerning passive robustness fault detection, the interval observer method
is themost used approach since observers are less model error sensitive than simulators and
less noise sensitive than predictors. Regarding the fault following effect, observers show a
rather better behaviour than predictors. Moreover, observers can avoid partially this effect
when using a proper observation gain. In relation to the wrapping effect and the complexity
associated with the computation of the system output interval estimation, last years the re-
search of adaptive thresholding algorithms which use interval models for fault detection and
isolation has been a very active research area Puig et al. (2003a). In Puig et al. (2003a), inter-
val observation applied to robust fault detection was introduced while an interval simulation
algorithm based on a optimization approach was proposed in Puig et al. (2003b) to compute
the system output interval estimation. Nevertheless, this algorithm uses a trajectory-based
approach resulting in a high computational complexity. A goal of this thesis is to determine
those conditions that the observer gain matrix must fulfil so that the wrapping effect can be
avoided and as a result, less computational cost (set-based) approaches as theMoore’s algo-
rithm could be used. Moreover, the effect of these conditions on the observer fault detection
performance will also be analyzed in order to see how it is affected
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2.5 Fault isolation using systemmodels
According to Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003), model-based fault isolation has been ap-
proached over the last two decades from two different scientific communities: Artificial In-
telligence, also known as the DX approach Hamscher et al. (1992), Reiter (1987) and Auto-
matic Control, also known as FDI approach Blanke et al. (2003), Gertler. (1998), Patton et al.
(2000). The DX approach relies upon a well-founded and logically based theory for diag-
nosis of static systems. From a logical point of view, fault detection is performed through
a consistency-check and organized around the conflict concept (fault signal). In this ap-
proach, fault localization or isolation is automatically derived from the conflict detection
stage, which usually relies upon some kind of dependency recording. On the other hand, the
FDI approach considers fault diagnosis as two separate tasks: fault detection and fault isola-
tionbasedon generating and evaluating a set of analytical redundancy relations obtainedoff-
line from elementary component models of the physical systems. Fault detection has tradi-
tionally beenmore deeply investigated in the FDI community using a broad set of techniques
(parity equations, observers and parameter estimation) and looking at the nuisance effects of
noise, perturbations and model uncertainty (robust fault detection) Chen and Patton (1999).
Conversely, fault isolation has been more deeply investigated in the DX community thanks
to the logical diagnosis theory developed by Reiter Reiter (1987). However, when this the-
ory has been applied to dynamical systems, some problems have appeared which prevent
to use it directly. In fact, the theoretical formalization for fault diagnosis applied to dynamic
systems is nowadays an open issue. These problems havemotivated further research on an-
alyzing off-line the set of dependencies which could become conflicts (fault signals) as in
the FDI approach Pulido and Alonso (2002), based on the common framework provided by
Cordier et al. (2000). According to Koscielny et al. (2004), fault isolation is carried out on the
basis of fault signals, φ, generated by the detectionmodule. Thus, the result of fault isolation
consists in showing the faults affecting to the system, what requires knowing the relationship
that exists between the fault signals, φ, and the faults, f . A completely reliable and unequiv-
ocal presentation of the existing faults or the definition of the diagnosed system state is not
always possible due to incomplete and uncertain knowledge of the system, limited distin-
guishability of faults or states, uncertainty of fault signals, etc. In general, the following kinds
of fault signals are applied as input signals of the fault isolation module or the system state
recognition process Koscielny et al. (2004):
• Residuals generated using the systemmodels.
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• Binary or multi-value signals created as a result of residual value evaluation.
• Binary ormulti-value signals (features) generatedwith the use of classical and heuristic
fault detection methods.
• Statistic parameters that describe random signal properties.
• Process variables, i.e., measured or calculated values of physical quantities.
2.5.1 Models applied to fault isolation
Models applied to fault isolation or system state recognition should thereforemap the space
of fault signals φ into the discrete space of faults f
(
φ→ f )
Fault isolation
model
φ→ f
f1
f2
f j
φ1
φ2
φi
Figure 2.5: Fault isolation model mapping fault signals and faults
In fault isolation, it is possible to point out the following kind of models Koscielny et al.
(2004):
• models that map the space of binary fault signals into the space of faults,
• models that map the space of multi-value fault signals into the space of faults,
• models that map the space of continuous fault signals into space of faults.
The above models can be defined using different techniques: training, knowledge about
the hardware redundant structure, modelling the influence of faults on residual values or the
expert’s knowledge. Training data for the state of complete efficiency and for all of the states
with faults, or at least a definition of the fault states are necessary in the case of applying the
training procedure. However, such data are difficult and often impossible to obtain in the
case of the industrial process diagnostics. Conversely, it is relatively easy to define the rela-
tionship that exists between fault signal values when using a hardware redundant structure
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in the diagnosed system. Nevertheless, such a solution is very rarely applied due to its high
costs.
If equations for the generation of residuals that contain the effect of faults are known,
then it is possible to define residual value ranges as well as fault signal values that correspond
to residuals for the state without faults and for the states with faults. Thereby, sets of fault
signal values are obtained for particular faults and for the state of complete efficiency. These
sets define specific regions in the space of fault signals. Thismethod requires amathematical
description of the system which must allow deriving the effect of faults on the residuals or
fault signals. Another method consists in using an expert’s knowledge. The expert should
define fault signal values that correspond to particular faults. As a result, fault signal space
regions that correspond to states with single faults and to the non-faulty state are arbitrarily
defined.
2.5.2 Modelsmapping the space of binary fault signals into the space of faults
Binary fault signals φi ∈ {0,1} are obtained as a result of a two-value evaluation of residuals
or process variable value features. They are also generated as a result of implementing tests
which consist in controlling limits or examining the heuristic relationships existing among
process variables. In this model group, it is possible to single out the following models
Binary diagnostic matrix The model most often applied is a relation defined on the Carte-
sian product of the sets of faults f = { f j : j = 1,2, . . . ,nf } and fault signals φ ={
φi : 1,2, . . . ,nφ
}
: FSM ⊂ φ× f , where FSM is the binary diagnostic matrix Gertler.
(1998), Cordier et al. (2000) which is also known in the FSM community as the theo-
retical fault signaturematrix Gertler. (1998). Thismatrix stores the binary influence of a
given fault f j (column of FSM) on a given fault signal φi ( row of FSM ). Thereby, if the
element FSMi j of this matrix is equal to 1, it means the fault f j causes the occurrence
of the fault signal φi . Otherwise, when the fault f j has no effect on the fault signal φi ,
the element FSMi j is equal to 0. Such as the FSM matrix is defined, its j th−column
contains the binary effect of fault f j on the fault signal set φi . In consequence, this
column is known as the theoretical fault signature of f j . This binary diagnostic matrix
can be defined on the grounds of the residual equations which take into account the
effect of faults.
Diagnostic trees and graphs The relationship that exists between faults and fault signals
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can be presented in the form of a binary tree that defines themethod of diagnostic in-
ference Ulerich and Powers (1988). The tree vertices correspond to fault signals (tests).
Out of each of the vertices come out two branches corresponding to two values of the
fault signal: the true and the false result of the test. A fault signal having a value that
is analyzed as the first one is the root of the tree. Such a tree can be defined using the
theoretical fault signature matrix FSM Blanke et al. (2003), or directly on the basis of
an expert’s knowledge.
Figure
Rules and logic functions According to Koscielny et al. (2004), the relationship existing be-
tween faults and binary fault signals can be defined in the form of the following types:
Algorithm2.1 Fault Isolation using logic functions: parallel reasoning
1: if φ1 = 0 and . . . andφ j = 1. . . and φnφ = 1 then
2: f aul t← fk
3: end if
Algorithm2.2 Fault Isolation using logic functions: serial reasoning
1: if φ1 = 1 then
2: f aul t← fα or . . . or fk or . . . or fnf
3: end if
Every column of the theoretical fault signature matrix FSM allow obtaining a rule of
the type given by Algorithms 2.1: this kind of rules is known as parallel reasoning and
in general, they are used in the FDI approaches. Conversely, the rows of FSM allow
defining rules of the type given by Algorithms 2.2 which are known as series reasoning
and usually they are used in DX approaches.
The logic function is the simplest possible relationship that exists between fault signals
and faults. Binary fault signals act as input, and the result of this function shows the
state of a particular fault, i.e., its existence or absence. In a general case, such a function
takes the following form:
z fk =
[
φa ∨·· ·∨φb
]∧ [φi ∨·· ·∨φ j ]∧·· ·∧ [φm ∨·· ·∨φnφ] (2.32)
where z fk is a the system binary state which indicates the occurrence of fault fk : its
value is 1 when fk is isolated and 0 when it is not.
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2.5.3 Models mapping the space of multi-value fault signals into the space of
faults
Multi-value fault signals appear as a result of residual value or signal feature quantization.
They can also result from process variable limit control with the application of several limit-
ing values. It is assumed that a different set of values wi can correspond to each one of the
fault signals φi . Thereby, models necessary for fault isolation using multi-value fault signals
realize the following mapping Koscielny et al. (2004).
φ ∈wi ×·· ·×wi ×·· ·×wnφ ⇒ f ∈ {0,1}nf (2.33)
It is possible to single out the following models belonging to this group: fault information
systems, diagnostic trees and graphs, and if-then rules.
Fault information system: FIS
This type of models derives from the information system models used in the set theory de-
veloped by Pawlak (1983) in the early 1980s. The fault information system models (FIS) were
first introduced by Kos´cielny (2001) and they can be seen as an extension of binary theoret-
ical fault signature matrix (FSM) where the values of its non-null elements are not a binary
ones but they belong to the set of values wi j for the fault signal φi and the fault f j . This fact
allows adding fault distinguishability when using these models in fault isolation. According
to Kos´cielny (2001), a fault information system FIS is defined as follows:
F IS = 〈 f ,φ,wφ,μ〉 (2.34)
where wφ is the set of values that contains all the values of the set wi j associated with
every couple
〈
φ, f j
〉
wφ=
nφ∪
i=1
nf∪
j=1
(2.35)
Regarding μ, this is a function defined as
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μ :φ× f →wφ (2.36)
that determines for every couple
〈
φi , f j
〉
, the corresponding set of values related to φi :
μ
(
φi , f j
)=wi j (2.37)
Therefore, FIS is a table that defines fault signal pattern values for particular faults which
has the following characteristics regarding the binary FSM:
• Individual set of fault signal values can exist for each one of the fault signals.
• The set of the i th−fault signal values can be a multi-value one.
• Any element of the FIS can contain either one fault signal value or a subset of values.
2.5.4 Othermodels
Mapping the space of multi-value fault signals into the space of faults or system states can
also be represented in the form of a tree or if-then-type rules Venkatasubramanian et al.
(2003). These diagnostic trees are a generalization of the binary ones presented previously
where the number of branches coming out of each node that corresponds to a fault signal
equals the number of values that each one of the signals can have. The relation existing be-
tween faults and fault signals values can be defined using expressions, see Algorithm 2.3 and
2.4.
Algorithm2.3 Columns of the FIS table
1: if φ1 ∈w1k and . . . andφ j ∈wnjk . . . and φnφ ∈wnφk then
2: f aul t← fk
3: end if
Algorithm2.4 Fault Isolation using logic functions: serial reasoning
1: if φ1 ∈wjk then
2: f aul t← fα or . . . or fk or . . . or fnf
3: end if
Thereby, rules of the form given by Algorithms 2.3 can be derived from the columns of
the FIS table, while rules of the form given by Algorithms 2.4 correspond to the rows of this
table.
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Models mapping the space of continuous fault signals into the space of faults
Residuals obtained using systemmodels generate continuous fault signals. In this case,mod-
els applied to fault isolation consider the following mapping:
φ ∈Rnφ⇒ f ∈ {0,1}n f (2.38)
Thereby, considering the space of continuous fault signals, the effect of a fault f j on the
fault signal set ö is defined by a region which should be characteristic of each fault so that
a fault can be isolated. Some methods used to model the mapping defined by Eq.(2.38) are:
classic methods of pattern recognition, neural networks, and neural fuzzy networks.
Pattern pictures The construction of amodel for fault isolation consists therefore in defin-
ing regions in the space of fault signals which constitute pattern pictures of faults. These
regions can be defined in different ways. Thus, it is possible to single out geometrical, poly-
nomial and statistical classifiers Tadeusiewicz (1991). Pattern recognition can be obtained
during the process of training. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to possess training data
for all of faults. However, this is extremely difficult, and formany industrial systems even im-
possible. The data can be obtained by fault simulation with the use of the system analytical
model that takes the effect of faults into account.
Fuzzy neural networks Fuzzy neural networks applied to fault isolation realize the fuzzy
evaluation of residual values as well as diagnostic inference Syfert and Kos´cielny (2001). The
structure of a fuzzy neural network applied to fault isolation differs from the structures used
for system modelling. It contains no layer in which defuzzification is carried out. The num-
ber of network outputs equals the number of distinguished faults or system states.
2.5.5 Model-based fault isolation techniques
There are a high variety of isolation methods. Isermann and Balle (1996) distinguishes two
basic groups: classification methods and automatic concluding methods. According to
Kos´cielny et al. (2004), the fault isolation methods can be classified depending on how the
knowledge about the relation between fault signals and faults is obtained. In line with this
last criterion, Kos´cielny et al. (2004) signals out the following methods:
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• Methods in which the diagnostic relation results from the structure of mathematical or
qualitative models used for detecting faults.
• Methods that require defining the relation between fault signals and faults during the
training phase.
• Methods based on an expert’s knowledge.
• Methods in which the relation between fault signals and faults results from a redun-
dant hardware structure. Concerning the relation between fault signals and faults, the
following model-based fault isolation methods can be highlighted
– Graphs, Thoma and B.O. (2000), Mosterman et al. (1995), Blanke et al. (2003).
– Binary diagnostic matrix, Gertler. (1998).
– Information system, Kos´cielny (2001).
– Fault-attributed regions in the space of fault signals, Gertler. (1998),
Isermann and Chen (1991).
– Neural networks.
– Fuzzy neural networks.
The problems of choosing an adequate set of detection algorithms in order to ensure, among
other things, the required distinguishability of faults will be dealt in the successive subsec-
tions.
2.6 General approaches to fault isolation
In this section, general fault isolationmethods using the fault isolation models introduced in
Section 2.5.1 will be described.
2.6.1 Fault isolation based on the binary diagnostic matrix
The binary diagnostic matrix FSM presents the relation existing between the values of binary
fault signals φ and faults f. It can be designed using system equations and taking the effect
of faults into account or on the basis of an expert fs knowledge. Fault isolation inference
carried out by means of the binary diagnostic matrix can be realized with the use of classical
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Gertler. (1998) or fuzzy logic Kos´cielny (2001). The latter approach allows taking fault signal
uncertainty into consideration.
The binary diagnostic matrix is used for fault isolation together with different fault de-
tection methods under the specification that the fault signals being the outputs of the fault
detection algorithms have to be binary ones. Fault isolation methods using the binary fault
isolation matrix can isolate faults comparing the value of the observed fault signals with the
information stored in that matrix FSM. Thereby, there are two main groups of fault isolation
methods using a binary FSM matrix depending on how they carry out this comparison: par-
allel inference approach and series inference approach.
Rules of parallel diagnostic inference on the assumption about single faults
Parallel diagnostic inference based on the binary diagnostic matrix consists in formulating
a fault isolation result comparing the observed binary fault signals φ = {φi : i = 1,2, . . . ,nφ}
where φi ∈ {0,1} with the theoretical fault signature associated with all considered fault hy-
potheses determined by the set f = { f j : j = 1,2, . . . ,nf } Kos´cielny (1995), Gertler. (1998). The
theoretical fault signature of the fault hypothesis f j is stored in the j th−column of matrix
FSM where each element of this matrix FSMi j ∈ {0,1}.
Assuming that only a single fault exists, fault isolation is carried out using the set of ob-
served fault signals φ. Thereby, the inference procedure consists in comparing the binary
fault signals φi computed at every time instant by the fault detection module with the theo-
retical binary fault signature related to every fault hypothesis f j of the set f which is stored
in the j th−column of the binary matrix FSM. If all fault signals are zero-valued, the fault iso-
lation module shows a lack of faults:
∀φi ∈φ :φi = 0⇒DGN= 0 (2.39)
where DGN is the set of fault hypothesis f j which are consistent with the observed fault
signals. When some fault signal values equal one according to the residual evaluation carried
out by the fault detection module, the fault isolation algorithm gives as diagnosis result a
subset of the fault hypothesis set f whose signatures are consistent with the observations:
DGN= { f j ∈ f :φi = FSMi j ,∀φi ∈φ} (2.40)
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In case, using a robust fault detection approach based on interval models, the binary
value of every fault signal is computed as it follows
φi =
⎧⎨
⎩ 0 yik ∈
[
yˆik
]
1 yik ∉
[
yˆik
] (2.41)
Then, a general approach of carrying out the comparison between the observed fault sig-
natureφi and the theoretical one related to every fault hypotheses is calculating the distance
between both vectors: φi and the j th−column ofmatrix FSM for the hypothesis f j , e.g. using
the Hamming distance measurement. As a result of this comparison, a distance measure-
ment djk is obtained for every fault hypothesis f j , being dk the vector of all the computed
distances at time instant k : dk =
[
d1k ,d2k . . . ,dnf k
]
. If the Hamming distance approach is
applied, then
djk =
nφ∑
i=l
(
FSMi j ⊕φik
)
(2.42)
where ⊕ is the XOR logic operator. Then, the fault hypotheses with the shortest distance
regarding the current observed fault signature φ are considered as the fault isolation result:
DGN=
{
f j ∈ f :∀ j where djk = min∀v∈{1,...,nf } [dvk ]
}
(2.43)
This approach gives a simple idea of the fault isolation problem but it has many draw-
backs which can lead towards a wrong diagnosis result: e.g., this algorithm always provides
a diagnosis result, even when no fault hypothesis exactly matches the current observed fault
signature vector. Consequently, this can cause the diagnosis to jump from a fault hypoth-
esis to another fault hypothesis, every time instant when a new symptom appears. Mostly,
this fault isolation methods using the binary theoretical fault signature matrix and based on
a parallel inference are used by the FDI community which uses analytical models to moni-
tor the system. In this community, this method is known as the fault isolation column view
approach. In general, the single fault assumption is not always justified. In that case, the
states ofmultiple faults should be taken into account in the diagnostic inference. It is usually
sufficient to widen the set of the analyzed states of the system with the states with multiple
faults. This can be done by increasing the number of columns of the theoretical fault signa-
ture matrix FSM or equally, increasing the fault set, f ,grouping single faults. Thereby, there
will be a new column for each of the new consideredmultiple fault states where each of these
columns shows the theoretical effect of the relatedmultiple fault state on the residuals, such
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as it was done for the case of single fault assumption.
Rules of series diagnostic inference on the assumption about single faults
Series diagnostic inference consists in analyzing subsequent fault signal values φik and
formulating the diagnosis step by step, each time narrowing the set, f, of possible faults
Kos´cielny (1995), Gertler. (1998). Unlike the parallel diagnostic inference method, this ap-
proach is mostly applied by the DX community. The fault isolation process begins after the
first fault signal has been observed, φ1ik = 0→ φi1k+1 = 1, where subindex "i1" stands for
the first observed component of the fault signal vector). Thus, the appearance of this fault
signal implies the existence of a fault of the set f which φi1k is sensitive to. The subset of fault
hypotheses satisfying this condition is shown in the first given fault diagnosis:
DGN1 =
{
f j :∀ j : f j∈ f
[
FSMi1 j = 1
]}
(2.44)
Thereby, this subset DGN1 of f is the set of possible fault hypotheses which must be con-
sidered when the next fault signal will be observed. In consequence, the performance of this
method allows narrowing the set of possible fault hypotheses every time a new fault signal
occurs. In general, once the series diagnostic inference has been applied p −1 times and a
new fault signal φi pk has been observed, the result of the new series diagnostic inference
can be written as it follows:
DGNp =DGNp−1∩
{
f j :∀ j : f j∈ f
[
FSMi p j = 1
]}
(2.45)
In general, the series diagnostic inference only considers those fault hypotheses which
can explain all the observed fault signals. If the theoretical fault signature related to a given
fault hypothesis f j contains a null value
(
FSMi j = 0
)
where a fault signal has been observed,
φik = 1, this fault hypothesis will be automatically rejected by this method. Regarding the
parallel diagnostic inference method presented previously, this series reasoning avoids the
flickering of the fault diagnosis result mentioned in the parallel diagnostic approach since
this series inference method is based on an incremental reasoning and not on an absolute
reasoning such as it is used by the column view approach. Therefore, this method is more
suitable for those dynamic systems with time delays. On the other hand, the drawback of
this incremental reasoning is that every inference process leads to a set of possible faults
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requiring the observation of all affected fault signals in order to give the final fault isolation
result but conversely, the time it requires is unknown by this method because temporal or
dynamics aspects of the fault signals are not considered.
Asmentioned in the fault parallel diagnostic inferencemethod, thismethod assumes the
single fault hypothesis. However, this method can deals with multiple faults if the number of
columns of the FSM is increased considering an extra column (theoretical fault signature) for
each consideredmultiple fault hypotheses, such asmentioned in the column view approach.
2.6.2 Diagnosing based on the information system
The information system is a generalization of the binary diagnostic matrix FSM allows ap-
plying a multi-value evaluation of residuals, carried out individually for each fault signal.
Thereby, a generalization of the binary parallel and series inference methods can be distin-
guished in this approach. Moreover, although this approach is defined in the single fault
assumption, it can also deal with multiple fault hypotheses increasing the set f of fault hy-
potheses considering the multiple fault case, such as it was described in the fault in the bi-
nary diagnostic matrix method explained previously
Parallel diagnostic inference based on the fault information system
The general shape of a diagnosis based on the fault information system FIS can be described
by the following formula
DGN= { f j ∈ f :φi ∈μ(φi , f j ) ,∀φi ∈φ} (2.46)
The diagnosis shows those faults whose theoretical signatures, which are predetermined
by the FIS function μ
(
φi , f j
)
, are consistent with the obtained values of the observed fault
signals φik . This consistency means that the value of each fault signal belongs to the subset
of pattern values μ
(
φi , f j
)
defined in the FIS.
Comparing this approach with the binary parallel inferencemethod based on the binary
fault diagnostic matrix, the fact of considering the fault information system instead of the
binary matrix FSM adds more fault distinguishability. However, it does not avoid the fault
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isolation flickering problem which affects the binary approach since this is due to the ab-
solute reasoning process of this method and the fact that the temporal aspects of the fault
signals are not taken into account.
Series diagnostic inference based on the fault information system
Series diagnostic inference based on the fault system information is carried out similarly as
in the case of the binary diagnostic matrix. Thus, fault isolation process begins after the first
fault signal has been observed φi1k = 0 → φk+1 = 1. Then, the first diagnosis contains all
faults detected by this fault signal:
DGN1 =
{
f j :∀ j : f j∈ f
[
φi ∈ μ
(
φi , f j
)]}
(2.47)
the performance of this method allows narrowing the set of possible fault hypotheses every
time a new fault signal occurs. Then, after applying this inference p−1 times and observing
a new fault signal φi pk, the result of the new series diagnostic inference can be written as it
follows:
DGNp =DGNp−1∩
{
f j :∀ j : f j∈ f
[
φi p ∈μ
(
φi p , f j
)]}
(2.48)
The basic advantage of serial inference is the possibility of giving the current diagnosis at
every moment of the diagnosis. In order to obtain the final diagnosis, the interpretation of
all diagnostic signals usually is not necessary. In consequence, it is possible to obtain a fault
diagnosis in a shorter period of time than in the case of parallel inference. That is only possi-
ble when all the fault hypotheses are clearly distinguishable from the isolation point of view.
Otherwise, all fault signals must be observed in order to give the resultant fault diagnosis be-
ing unknown the required time. However, the fact of considering a fault information system
(FIS) instead of a binary diagnostic matrix (FSM) allows adding more fault distinguishabil-
ity to the fault isolation reasoning being this point the advantage regarding the binary fault
diagnostic matrix approach.
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Diagnosing based on the residual space
In the case of fault detection carried out with the use of system models, a set of residuals
is generated. The space whose all elements are residuals is called residual space, or parity
space Isermann and Chen (1991). Thus, the residual set needs to have distinctive properties
regarding each considered particular fault so that the fault can be isolated. Residual sets
designed with this objective in mind are referred to as enhanced residuals. There are two
fundamental residual enhancement approaches:
• Directional residuals. In order to ensure the possibility of isolating faults, the set of
residuals is designed in such a way that the occurrence of particular faults character-
izes the specific (unique for each fault) place of residuals in the parity space. One can
therefore assign to each of the faults an individually designeddirectional vectorGertler.
(1998), Isermann and Chen (1991).
• Structured residuals. They are designed so that each residual responds to a different
subset of faults and is insensitive to the others. When a particular fault occurs, some of
the residuals do respond and others do not. Then, the pattern of the response set, the
fault signature, must be characteristic of that fault so that it can be isolated.
In general, those fault isolation methods using these enhanced residuals are based on the
binary fault diagnostic matrix approaches explained previously Gertler. (1998) being affected
by the same drawbacks.
Other methods
Many other fault isolation methods are applied beside the ones presented above. It is possi-
ble to distinguish:
• Pattern recognition methods. The possibility of applying pattern recognition methods
in diagnostics results from the assumption that a certain class of system patterns being
in a defined technical state are closer to each other than system patterns in other states
despite measurement errors, different random factors, etc. Himmelblau (1978), Pau
(1981).
• Diagnostic graphs. Fault isolation in these methods consists in defining graph paths,
which can explain an incorrect operation of the system. Bond graphs form a method
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of physical system modelling Thoma and B.O. (2000) which describe transformation,
storage and dissipation of energy within the system, and present these processes in
the form of a graph which connects process variables. Thereby, this graph form is built
on the grounds of the physical equations that describe the system. Diagnostics with
the application of bond graphs was used by Mosterman et al. (1995).
• Diagnostic inference on the basis of inconsistency. This group of methods was initiated
byReiter (1987). In this approach, diagnosis is formulated on thebasis of the analysis of
inconsistencies detected in the operation of the system. Inconsistencies are detected
as a result of the comparison of the system operation and the model on the basis of
measurement data. The detected inconsistencies are the basis for generating the set of
conflicts understood as system element sets that contain a faulty element
2.6.3 Analytical model-based fault isolation techniques
Traditionally, applying this analytical approach to fault isolation, the relationship between
fault signals, φ, and faults f is inferred using the analytical model of the system. In general,
this relationship is obtained using the residual equations, r , (Eq. (2.2)) or the analytical re-
dundant relations (ARR’s) built on the grounds of the considered system model. Although
using accurate systemmodels, themost of the FDI fault isolation approaches just consider a
binary interface between fault detection and fault isolation modules. These approaches are
based, in general, on the binary diagnostic matrix FSM, this architecture can be described by
As a result of this poor interface, these methods are affected by certain drawbacks which
can lead to a wrong fault diagnosis result:
• The presence of noise produces chattering using the binary evaluation of the residual.
• All fault signals φik affected by a certain fault f jk according to the structure of the ma-
trix FSM should be activated at the same time instant and they should be persistently
observed during the whole fault isolation process. Otherwise, a wrong fault diagno-
sis result could be given. Nonetheless, because fault signals have their own dynamics,
neither they necessarily have to be activated at the same time nor they are persistently
observed.
• Restricting the relation between faults and fault signals to a binary one causes a loss of
useful information that can add fault distinguishability and accurateness to the fault
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Figure 2.6: Binary fault detection and fault isolation architecture
isolation algorithm preventing possible wrong fault diagnosis results. The occurrence
of a fault causes the apparition of a certain subset of fault signals such that each of
them have characteristic dynamical properties for this fault which can improve the
performance of the fault isolation algorithm if they are taken into account.
In general, these drawbacks are caused because the dynamics and the discrete event na-
ture of the fault signals are not considered. Thereby, restricting the interface between fault
detection and fault isolation to a binary one causes the loss of crucial information which can
enhance the whole fault diagnosis process. A significant fault signal properties that should
be considered are:
• The sign of the fault signal.
• The sensitivity of the fault signal regarding to each fault hypothesis.
• The order of the fault signal occurrence
• The time required for a fault signal to be observed once the fault occurs.
Some of the most important non-binary fault isolation methods that try to tackle some
of the drawbacks mentioned previously are:
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• DMP-DiagnosticModel Processor Petti et al. (1990). In this method, the binary fault in-
dication test in Eq. (2.41) is replaced by a fuzzy one based on the Kramer function pre-
venting the chattering of the test result. Besides, instead of using a binary diagnostic
matrix, FSM, a matrix with the same structure is applied but each element is related to
the steady-state value of the fault residual sensitivity propertyGertler. (1998)associated
with this element. Regarding the fault isolation, this is still based on a kind of parallel
diagnostic inferencemethod, in spite of its mentioned weaknesses: e.g., DMP-method
is blind for unexpected fault signals and thus, a wrong fault diagnosis can be obtained
• DMA-Deep Model Algorithm Chang et al. (1994). This method improves some weak-
nesses of the DMPmethod.
• Finite State Automatons Lunze(1994). This is the firstmethod to dealwith time aspects.
In this automaton, every state represents a partial or complete diagnosis. During the
reasoning process, the automaton switches from an initial state to partial-diagnosis
states and in the end to a final diagnosis. Every transition is connected to a condi-
tion that depends on time and the upcoming fault signals. Thus, time windows can
be defined for every transition and the time dependent fault pattern can be codified.
Although thismethod considers time aspects related to the fault signals, it is still a pure
binary method being affected by the already mentioned drawbacks of the binary ap-
proaches.
• DTS-Dynamic Table of States Kos´cielny (1995). Its major benefit is that it establishes
a fault signal detection time, which describes the maximum time between the occur-
rence of a certain fault and the observation of a certain fault signal. Those times can
be derived from the monitored system model or they are known from the system ex-
pert knowledge. Regarding the used fault isolation algorithm, it is based on a parallel
diagnostic inference approach and therefore, it suffers from the drawbacksmentioned
previously.
• BM- Behavioural Modes Nyberg (1999). In the BM method, the monitored system
is divided in several components, each of them having different behavioural modes:
fault-free mode and different faulty ones. In contrast to many other methods, the BM
method uses explicit models of every behavioural mode of the components. Thus, this
approach compares the real system to those system models. An advantage of this ap-
proach is that it is possible to isolate multiple faults thanks to the negative reasoning.
Additionally, any fault type can bemodelled andmany different ones for every compo-
nent. Besides, the whole dynamic behaviour of a fault is modelled. On the other hand,
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the size of the fault has to be known in order to get model-based estimations of the
faulty system behaviour that exactly correspond to the behaviour of the real system.
Thereby, this method requires a big effort in order to model all the behavioural modes
of the system components and to identify the fault is affecting the system.
Considering the drawbacks of all the approaches presented previously, the second part of
this thesis is focused on the interface between fault detection and fault isolation proposed by
Ingimundarson et al. (2005b). Thismethod can be viewed as an extension of the binary diag-
nostic matrix proposed by Gertler. (1998) in the sense that considers one diagnostic matrix
FSM for each fault signal property: binary, sign, fault residual sensitivity, fault signal occur-
rence order and fault signal occurrence time. Thereby, this method, once the fault signal
appears, registers all these properties in order to compare their values with the theoretical
ones stored in several diagnostic matrices. Moreover, instead of using the binary fault de-
tection test given by Eq. (2.41), this method uses a fuzzy test based on the one proposed
by the DMP-method. As illustrated in Ingimundarson et al. (2005b) the interface has an ap-
pealing performance when used in dynamical systems. Nonetheless, it is affected by some
weaknesses which are derived from some simplifications:
• Although every fault signal has its own dynamics and consequently, its properties
evolve with the time, this method just considers the steady-state value of them.
• This method does not consider interval models and as a result, it uses a fixed fault
detection threshold instead of an adaptive one.
• This method just considers a simulation model of the monitored system.
Regarding the fault isolation interface, one of the goals of this thesis will be to tackle the
previous weaknesses of this interface using an interval observer model of the system. On the
other hand, concerning the fault isolation algorithm, this thesis deals with the fact that a fault
affecting the monitored system will generate a unique temporal sequence of fault signals
(events) where every fault signal evolves according to its own dynamics. Thereby, observing
this sequence and registering its dynamical properties, the fault can be isolated. This fault
isolation discrete-event approach built on the grounds of the analytical model of the system
can be considered neither as a pure quantitative approach nor as a pure qualitative one but
as a hybrid approach.
48 Chapter 2 : State of art in Fault Diagnosis
Fault isolation based on interval observers
The main idea of using an extension of the fault detection and fault isolation interface pro-
posed by Ingimundarson et al. (2005b) is that these twomodules can not be considered sep-
arately when a fault diagnosis process is carried out. The reason is that the result of the fault
detection module, a temporal sequence of fault signals, has a crucial influence of the whole
fault isolation process since:
• When a permanent fault occurs, a fault signal might not be observed permanently as a
result of the fault following effect of the used systemmodel.
• Certain expected fault signals can not be observed because the size of the fault is not
big enough so that the related fault detection test (Eq. (2.41)) can indicate the fault
according to the corresponding adaptive threshold.
• In general, fault isolation requires the observation of a subset of fault signals in order to
determine a result. In consequence, the fact that every fault signal has its own dynam-
ics and some of them can not be observed persistently o simply, they are not observed,
can lead to a wrong fault isolation result if the whole fault diagnosis process does not
take into account these circumstances.
In general, this influence between fault detection and fault isolation modules is obviated
assuming an ideal fault detection result. This approach can lead to inconsistent resultswhich
might determine wrong decisions. These negative aspects can be prevented if dynamical
properties of fault signals are taken into account by the fault isolationmodule such as it is the
case of the mentioned extension of the approach proposed by Ingimundarson et al. (2005b).
2.7 Summary
CHAPTER 3
PEM FUEL CELL SYSTEM MODEL
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Fuel Cell Basics
A fuel cell consists of a negatively charged electrode (anode), a positively charged electrode
(cathode), and an electrolyte membrane. Hydrogen is oxidized on the anode and oxygen is
reduced on the cathode. Protons are transported from the anode to the cathode through the
electrolyte membrane, and the electrons are carried to the cathode over the external circuit.
In nature, molecules cannot stay in an ionic state, therefore they immediately recombine
with other molecules in order to return to the neutral state. Hydrogen protons in fuel cells
stay in the ionic state by traveling frommolecule to molecule through the use of special ma-
terials. The protons travel through a polymer membrane made of persulfonic acid groups
with a Tefl on backbone. The electrons are attracted to conductivematerials and travel to the
load when needed. On the cathode, oxygen reacts with protons and electrons, forming water
and producing heat. Both the anode and cathode contain a catalyst to speed up the electro-
chemical processes The fuel and oxidant do not mix at any point, and no actual combustion
occurs. The fuel cell therefore is not limited by the Carnot efficiency and, theoretically (al-
though not practically), can yield 100%efficiency. Fuel cells are primarily classified according
to the electrolyte material. The choice of electrolyte material also governs the operating tem-
perature of the fuel cell. The Polymer ElectrolyteMembrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC), also known as
Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell (PEM) fuel cells are the most popular type of fuel cell,
and traditionally use hydrogen as the fuel. PEM fuel cells also have many other fuel options,
which range from hydrogen to ethanol to biomass-derived materials. These fuels can either
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Fuel cell type Electrolyte used Operating temperature (oC ) Electrode Reactions
Polymer electrolyte Polymer membrane 60-140
Anode H2↔ 2H++2e−
Cathode 1/2O2+2H++2e−↔H2O
Direct methanol Polymer Membrane 30-80
Anode CH3OH +H2O↔CO2+6H++6e−
Cathode 3/2O2+6H++6e−↔ 3H2O
Alkaline Potassium hydroxide 150-200
Anode H2+2OH ↔H2O+2e−
Cathode 1/2O2+H2O+2e−↔ 2OH−
Phosphoric acid Phosphoric acid 180-200
Anode H2↔ 2H++2e−
Cathode 1/2O2+2H++2e−↔H2O
Molten carbonate Lithium/potassium carbonate 650
Anode H2+CO2−3 ↔H2O+CO2+2e−
Cathode 1/2O2+CO2+2e−↔CO2−3
Solid oxide Yittria stabilized zirconia 1000
Anode H2+O−2 ↔H2O+2e−
Cathode 1/2O2+2e−↔O−2
Table 3.1: Classification of fuel cells.
be directly fed into the fuel cell, or sent to a reformer to extract pure hydrogen, which is then
directly fed to the fuel cell.
3.2 Fuel Cell Classification
Since the invention of fuel cells by Sir William Grove in 1839, several type have been de-
veloped in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Nearly as many classifications have
appeared in the literature M.N (1988, 1993), Agency (2005) because there are a vast num-
ber of variable among the fuel cell systems, such as type of fuel and electrolyte, operating
temperature, primary and regeneration systems, and direct or indirect systems. Based on
the principle that a fuel cells generate electricity from an electrochemical reaction between
oxygen and hydrogen, creating water and heat as byproducts. Most fuel cells are able to use
oxygen from air. The fuel cell may be designed to use either pure hydrogen or reformate (hy-
drogen derived from hydrocarbon or other fuels). Table 5.2 lists the various types of fuel cells
along with electrolyte used, operating temperature, and electrode reactions.
What is commonly referred to as a fuel cell is a stack assembly made up of individual
cells. Each cell consists of a cathode and an anode (the positive and negative electrode, re-
spectively), an electrolyte, and a catalyst. Hydrogen fuel is fed into the anode side of
the cell. Oxygen (from air) is fed into the cathode side. Utilizing a catalyst, the hydrogen
molecules (H2) are dissociated into hydrogen ions (protons) and electrons, as follows: H2 ↔
2e− + 2H+. The protons pass through the electrolyte, while the free electrons are directed
through a circuit to the cathode. As the electrons travel their separate path, they create the
electric current used to power a load. At the cathode, the hydrogen ions combinewith oxygen
to create water according to the reaction: 2H++1/2O2↔H2O.
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3.3 PEM Fuel Cells
PEM Fuel Cell system takes its names from the type of electrolyte: a polymeric mem-
brane with high proton conductivity when the membrane is conveniently hydrated
Larminie and Dicks (2003). A fuel cell is an electrochemical engine, different from batter-
ies in that it requires a fuel source. When fuel supply, humidification and cooling systems
are well managed, fuel cells provide clean, quiet and reliable power. The basic PEM fuel cell
stack consists of a proton exchange membrane (PEM), catalyst and gas diffusion layers, flow
field plates, gaskets and end plates as shown in Table 1-1: The actual fuel cell layers are the
PEM, gas diffusion and catalyst layers. These layers are sandwiched together using various
processes, and are called the membrane electrode assembly (MEA). A stack with many cells
hasMEAs Sandwiched between bipolar flow field plates and only one set of end plates.
There are many types of fuel cells currently in development, such as solid oxide or phos-
phoric acid. The distinction between different types of fuel cells is made based on the elec-
trolyte (transfer ion), and the operating temperature. Polymer electrolyte membrane fuel
cells (PEMFCs) hold the most promise for applications demanding low temperatures, pres-
sures, or rapidly changing power demands. Because of the numerous applications to which
PEMFCs are advantageous, such as vehicular or remote applications, PEMFCs are rapidly
gaining attention as a promising source of energy. Typically operating below the boiling point
of water, PEMFC stacks utilize the chemical energy from the reaction of hydrogen andoxygen
to produce electricity, water and heat. A PEMFC stack consists of numerous fuel cells elec-
trically combined in series. Treating the PEMFC stack as a black box, the basic inputs and
outputs are shown in Figure 3.4. Hydrogen gas (fuel) and oxygen from the air are supplied
to the individual cells within the stack through internal manifolds. These manifolds direct
gas to the individual cells in parallel. The fuel cell provides useful work through an external
circuit, where each cell is electrically connected in series.
3.3.1 PEMFuel Cell System operation
A fuel cell is an electrochemical engine, different from batteries in that it requires a fuel
source. When fuel supply, humidification and cooling systems are well managed, fuel cells
provide clean, quiet and reliable power. There are many types of fuel cells currently in de-
velopment, such as solid oxide or phosphoric acid. The distinction between different types
of fuel cells is made based on the electrolyte (transfer ion), and the operating temperature.
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Advantages Disadvantages
Hight operating efficiency FC are currently costly.
There are many types of fuel sources, and Fuel Reformation Technology can be costly
methods of supplying fuel to a fuel cell and heavy and need power in order to run.
Fuel cells have a highly scalable design Performance decreases over time
due to catalyst degradation
Fuel cells produce no pollutants
Fuel cells are low maintenance
Fuel cells do not need to be recharged as battery
Table 3.2: Fuel Cell Advantage and disadvantage
Polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cells (PEMFCs) hold the most promise for applications
demanding low temperatures, pressures, or rapidly changing power demands. Because of
the numerous applications to which PEMFCs are advantageous, such as vehicular or re-
mote applications, PEMFCs are rapidly gaining attention as a promising source of energy,
(Laraminie and Dicks, 2003, Carrette et al., 2001).
The hydrogen flows through the feeding channels of the anode, spreads through the dif-
fusion layer and reaches the catalytic layer where it tis oxidized releasing electrons and pro-
tons, see Table 3.3 Anode site. The released electrons are lead through the catalyticmetal and
the granulated coal of the catalytic layer of the anode, arriving at the cathode via the external
circuit, whereas the protons are transported through the membrane to the catalytic layer of
the cathode. At the same time, oxygen is injected in the feeding channels of the cathode and
spreads through the diffusion layer toward the catalytic layer, where it reacts with protons
and electrons, generating water, see Table 3.3 cathode side.
Section Reaction
Anode 2H2→ 4H++4e−
Cathode O2+4H++4e−→ 2H2O
Overall 2H2+O2→ 2H2O
Table 3.3: The electrochemical half-reactions for the anode and cathode
3.4 Mathematical Models in the Literature
Fuel cell modeling is helpful for fuel cell developers because it can lead to fuel cell design
improvements, as well as cheaper, better, and more efficient fuel cells. The model must be
robust and accurate and be able to provide solutions to fuel cell problems quickly. A good
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of a PEMFC stack
model should predict fuel cell performance under a wide range of fuel cell operating con-
ditions. Even a modest fuel cell model will have large predictive power. A few important
parameters to include in a fuel cell model are the cell, fuel and oxidant temperatures, the fuel
or oxidant pressures, the cell potential, and the weight fraction of each reactant.
The necessary improvements for fuel cell performance and operation demand better de-
sign, materials, and optimization. These issues can only be addressed if realistic mathemat-
ical process models are available. There aremany published models for PEM fuel cells in the
literature, but it is often a daunting task for a newcomer to the field to begin understanding
the complexity of the current models.
An important feature of each model is the mass transport descriptions of the anode,
cathode, and electrolyte. Several mass transport models are used. Simple Fick diffusion
models and effective Fick diffusion models typically use experimentally determined effec-
tive transport coefficients instead of Fick diffusivities, and do not account for convective fl
ow contributions. Therefore, many models use Nernst-Planck mass transport expressions
that combine Fick’s diffusion with convective fl ow. The convective fl ow is typically calcu-
lated fromDarcy’s law using different formulations of the hydraulic permeability coefficient.
Some models use Schlogl’s formulations for convective fl ow instead of Darcy’s law, which
also accounts for electroosmotic fl ow, and can be used for mass transport inside the PEM.
A very simple method of incorporating electroosmotic fl ow in the membrane is by apply-
ing the drag coefficient model, which assumes a proportion of water and fuel fl ow to pro-
ton fl ow. Another popular type of mass transport description is the Maxwell-Stefan formu-
lation for multicomponent mixtures. This has been used for gas-phase transport in many
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models, but this equation would be better used for liquid-vapor-phase mass transport. Very
few models use this equation for both phases. Surface diffusion models and models derived
from irreversible thermodynamics are seldom used. Mass transport models that use effec-
tive transport coefficients and drag coefficients usually only yield a good approximation to
experimental data under a limited range of operating conditions.
Amodel is only as accurate as its assumptions allow it to be. The assumptions need to be
well understood in order to understand the model’s limitations and to accurately interpret
its results. Common assumptions used in fuel cell modeling are:
• Ideal gas properties.
• Incompressible flow.
• Laminar flow.
• Isotropic and homogeneous electrolyte, electrode, and bipolar material structures.
• A negligible ohmic potential drop in components.
• Mass and energy transport is modeled from a macro-perspective using volume-
averaged conservation equations
Creating Mathematical a Model, the basic steps used for creating a mathematical model
are the same regardless of the system being modeled. The details vary somewhat from
method tomethod, but an understanding of the common steps, combined with the required
method, provides a framework in which the results from almost any method can be inter-
preted and understood. The basic steps of the model-building process are:
1. Model selection
2. Model fitting
3. Model validation
These three basic steps are used iteratively until an appropriate model for the data has
been developed. In the model selection step, plots of the data, process knowledge, and as-
sumptions about the process are used to determine the form of the model to be fit to the
data. Then, using the selected model and data, an appropriatemodel-fitting method is used
to estimate the unknown parameters in the model
3.4 : Mathematical Models in the Literature 55
3.4.1 Fuel Cell voltage
The reversible cell electromotive force (Eo,cel l ) is defi ned as the difference between the stan-
dard reduction potentials of the cathode and anode reactions (Eo,cathode and Eo,anode ). The
actual number may vary depending on the reactions that occur at these electrodes, but is
always positive. For example, in a hydrogen/oxygen polymer electrolyte fuel cell operated at
standard conditions, the reversible cell electromotive force 1.23 V. The standard free energy
change (ΔGo) of the overall reaction of the fuel cell is given by
ΔGo =−nFEo,cel l (3.1)
where n is the number of electrons transferred and F is Faraday’s constant. Because n,
F , and Eo,cel l are positive numbers, the standard free energy change of the overall reaction
is negative, indicating a spontaneous reaction. This is the thermodynamic rationale behind
fuel cell operation. In an ideal (reversible) fuel cell, the cell voltage is independent of the
current drawn. Practically, the reversible cell voltage is not realized even under open-circuit
(zero current) conditions due to the myriad irreversibilities that arise during fuel cell opera-
tion. The difference between actual cell voltage at a given current density (current per unit
active electrode area) and the reversible cell voltage for the reaction is termed overvoltage
(over potential when referring to a single electrode). Prominent sources of overvoltage in a
fuel cell are
• Mixed potential at electrodes.
• Activation losses.
• Ohmic losses.
• Mass transport losses.
The combined contributions of these sources of overvoltage cause the cell voltage output
to decrease with increasing current density. A plot of cell voltage vs. current density is known
as a polarization curve. A typical polarization curve for a hydrogen fueled polymer electrolyte
fuel cell is shown in Fig. 2. The power output of the fuel cell (in mW /cm2) is given by the
product of voltage and current density. A comprehensive discussion of irreversibility and
overvoltage in fuel cells is presented in the literature Liebhafsky and Cairns (1969).
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The water management in the cell is critical for an efficient operation
U.S. Department of Energy and Laboratory. (2002). The requirement for this type fo
cells is to maintain a high water content in the electrolyte to assure high protonic conductiv-
ity. The protonic conductivity of the electrolyte is hight when the membrane is completely
saturated of water
When a fuel cell operates, the voltage is less than this. The figures show the performance
of a typical single cell operating at about 70 oC , at normal air pressure
Figure 3.2: voltage for a typical low temperature, air pressure, fuel cell
3.5 PEM Fuel Cell Modelling
3.5.1 Nexa Fuel Cell SystemModel: Auxiliary Components
The system block diagram, showing the subsystem blocks along with input/output (I/O) sig-
nals, is illustrated in figure 3.4. In this chapter, the model of serveral componets shown in
the figure are explained. In this study, it focus on the reactant supply subsystem, voltage and
thermal model related to Nexa Fuel Cell system.
3.5.2 Static Compressor voltage controller
The calculation of the static feedforward is based on finding the compressor voltage, vcp ,
that achieves the air flow that replenishes the oxygen flow that, in turn, is depleted by the
reaction of hydrogen protons with oxygen molecules during a current command, Ist , in this
case where the compressor voltage is measured as function of current, vcp = f (Ist ), where is
used the% compressor used, then a static feed forward controller is proposed as:
vcp = ki1I 3st +ki2I 2st +ki3Ist +ki4 (3.2)
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where the parameter used in equation 3.2 where obtained using a solve nonlinear curve-
fitting (data-fitting) problem in least-squares sense, table 3.4 shows this values
Parameter Value
ki1 4.12E −04
ki2 −0.0458
ki3 2.143
ki4 37.02
Table 3.4: Compressor voltage static feedforward controller.
3.5.3 Compressor dynamic Model
In this part the compressor model is explained in detail, the compressor model is separated
into two parts; a static compressor which determines the air flow rate [kg/sec], the second
part represents the compressor and motor inertia and defines de compressor speed [r pm].
This model uses parameters calibrated based on lab data where the molar flow measured
(moles per second) corresponds to standard cube liter per minute [sl pm]. By using ideal
gas law andmol definition (mol volume equal to 22.4 liters), and also by converting minutes
into second it is possible to convert the inlet air flow in kilogram per second [kg/sec], see
appendix ??. Figure 3.3 shows the process diagram for air rawmaterial, which involves ambi-
ent, compressor, humidifier and cathode conditions such as pressure, temperature, flow and
humidity.
Assuming the heat exchange of the humidity exchanger, described in equation 3.3, where
εheat
∼= 0.6 is the sensible heat tranfer factor reported by Shevock (2008).
Tst −Tex = εheat (Thm −Tsm)= εheatΔTε (3.3)
Compressor Power (Pw )
The mass flow rate through the compressor, Wcp , and the total enthalpy change across the
compressor from the first law of thermodynamics as
Pw =Wcp
(
hcp −hatm
)
(3.4)
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Figure 3.3: Compressor Process Diagram.
Assuming constant specific heat coefficients, the power, Pw , is given by
Pw = WcpCp
(
Tcp −Tatm
)
(3.5)
= WcpCp (Thm −ΔTε−Tamb)
For an isentropic process the temperature ratio can be related to the pressure ratio using
the relation
Tcp,i s
Tamb
=
(
Phm
Patm
) γ−1
γ
(3.6)
The compressor isentropic efficiency, ηcp,i s , is introduced and defined as the ratio of the-
oretical(isentropic) temperature rise and actual temperature rise. To count for the fact that
the compression process is not isentropic, the compressor isentropic efficiency is defined as
ηcp =
Tcp,i s −Tatm
Tcp −Tatm
(3.7)
Then, it is posible to get
Tcp
Tamb
= 1+ 1
ηcp
[(
Phm
Patm
) γ−1
γ
]
(3.8)
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A lookup table of the compressor efficiency, ηcp,i s , this table was taken from
Pukrushpan and Stefanopoulou (2004) which is suitable for any king of low pressure com-
pressor. Combining Equation 3.5 and 3.8, it is possible to compute the power supplied by the
compressor.
Pw =Wcp Tamb
ηcp
[(
Phm
Patm
) γ−1
γ −1
]
(3.9)
Static compressor (Wcp )
For themathematical representation of the compressor flow characteristics, the flow through
the compressor can be expressed as function of pressure ratio (Pr ) and turbine shaft speed
(Ntc). The use of the scaled parameters eliminates the dependence of the performancemaps
on inlet condition (θ, δ). In (Moraal and Kolmanovsky, 1999) uses a simplification of amodel,
based on experimental data fromNexa Fuel Cell, its is known air flow supplied to cathode by
the supply manifold, in order to compute pressure ratio (Pr ) and the lack of Thm measure-
ment but the supply manifold volume known and using the ideal gas low, it is possible to
compute the pressure ratio.
Compressor Mas Flow.
The flow through the compressor can be expressed as a function of pressure ratio (Pr )
and turbine shaft speed (ωcp ). In order to calibrate the model with lab data the Jensen and
Kristensen method, described in Moraal and Kolmanovsky (1999), is used. To reflect vari-
ations in the inlet condition of the compressor (temperature and pressure, the "corrected"
value of mass flow rate and compressor speed are used in the compressor map, see Table 3.5.
Corrected parameter Units Description
Corrected Compressor speed rpm ωcrcp =ωcp/

θ
Mas flow kg/s Wcr =Wcp

θ/δ
Temperature K θ= Tcp,i /288
Pressure atm δ=Psm/Patm
Table 3.5: Corrected parameter correlation.
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The normalized compressor flow rate,Φ, is correlated with a dimensionless head param-
eter,Ψ, and mach number,M , then
Φ= Wcp
4πd2c ρairUcp
(3.10)
The dimensionless head parameter is defined
Ψ=
CpTamb
[
P
γ−1
γ
r −1
]
1/2U2cp
(3.11)
whereUcp is the compressor blade tip speed
Ucp = π
60
·dc ·ωcrcp (3.12)
and the inlet mach numberM introduced by
M = Ucp√
γRTcp,i
(3.13)
Zero slope line method is used to describes the compressor flow parameter,Φ, as a func-
tion of pressure ratio, Pr , and corrected speed, ωcrcp . The curve connecting the maximum
mass flow on each speed-line is characterized by a corelation as:
Φ= K3Ψ−K1
K 2+Ψ
(3.14)
where
Ki j = ki1+ki2M ,
i = 1,2,3, j = 1,2.
(3.15)
For the Nexa compressor map regression coefficients where obtained by fitting lab data
frommass the flowmeter, using a non linear curve fitting, see ?? the value of them are shown
in Table 3.6. Figure 3.4 show the model validation, note that the error is minimum for a
change in the Schedule variable (sv) in this cases this variable is the stack currentIst . In this
figure the section a) is shown the model, airflow estimated, and process data or lab data,
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airflow. The section b) is shown the model residual, note that the residual shown is good
enough for model validation.
Parameter (ki j ) Value
k11 -1.97E-04
k12 0.0014
k21 0.0143
k22 -0.0158
k31 -8.03E-04
k32 0.0088
Table 3.6: Compressor map coefficients.
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Figure 3.4: Airflowmodel validation. a) Model and lab data comparison, b) Model error.
Parameter Units Value
R J/(kg ·K ) 287
ρa kg/m3 1.23
dc m 0.07
Table 3.7: Compressor parameter
Dynamic compressor (ωcp )
The torque required to drive the compressor in N −m,τcp , it is calculated using power Equa-
tion 3.9 as
τcp =
PwCp
ωcp
= CpTatm
ωcpηcp
[
P
γ−1
γ
r −1
]
Wcp (3.16)
Using thermodynamics foundation from Equation 3.8 and 3.9, see Boyce. (1982). A
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derivation from them, a lumped rotational model with inertia is used to represent the dy-
namic behavior for compressor speed, ωcp , in r pm as
where kt ,Rcm and kv aremotor constants calculated to get amotormechanical efficiency
, ηcm , near to 95%. The constants value are given in Table 3.8.
Parameter Units Value
kv v/(r ad/s) 0.0153
kt N −m/amp 0.0165
Rcm Ω 1.2
ηcm % 95
Table 3.8: Compressor motor parameter
3.5.4 Supply Manifold
In this part of the model is taken in to account the dynamic of pressure, temperature and
flowmass. In the supply manifold volume of Nexa includes the pipe between compressor to
humidifier and , one-pass pipe of humidifier and humidifier to stack pipe, see Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Supply Manifold process diagram.
The mass conservation principle is used to develop themanifold model.
dm
dt
=Win −Wout (3.17)
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wherem is the mass of the gaes accumulated in themanifold volume andWi andWo are
mass flow rates into the out of the manifold. If it is assumed that
• The air temperature, T , is constant in themanifold.
• The air temperature, T , is equal to inlet flow temperature, Ti .
Then we can get a isothermal relation for pressure using ideal gas law. If the air tempera-
ture is expected to change in the manifold, the pressure dynamic equation from the energy
conservation and the ideal gas law
dP
dt
= R
V
(WiTi −WoTo) (3.18)
The rate of flow is a function of the upstream pressure,Pca and downstream pressure,
Psm and if the difference between the manifold and the downstream volume is small, the
flow region flow rate can be calculated by a linearized form of the sub-critical nozzle flow.
For the supply manifold, the inlet mass flow is the supply manifold and cathode, then
Wsm,o = ksm,o (Psm −Pca) (3.19)
where ksm,o is the linear constant for supplymanifold outlet flow, since the differential in
temperature occurs in the supply manifold because thermal effect of humidifier and using
Equation 3.18 and 3.19 and thermal assumptions described before, thus
dPsm
dt
= γR
Vsm
(
WcpTcp −Wsm,oTsm
)
= γR
Vsm
(
WcpTatm −Wsm,oTst
)
(3.20)
In this case where a Nexa system is used and it is not possible to know the exact volume
which is describe in Figure 3.5, andmathematical representation as
vsm = vcp +vhm,1+vca,1 (3.21)
The values for volume calculation are shown in Table 3.9. In the case where it is possible
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to assume the vhm,1 based on a thermal assumption that Tcp ∼= T amb.
Parameter Units Value
vcp m3 3.6E −5
vca m3 1E −5
vhm,1 m
3 1.55E −4
Table 3.9: Supply volume parameter
3.5.5 ReturnManifoldModel
The temperature of the air leaving the stack is relatively low then compared to the air leav-
ing the compressor. Therefore, the changes of air temperature in the return manifold are
negligible, and the returnmanifold pressure is modeled by
dPrm
dt
= γRTrm
Vrm
(
Wca,o −Wrm,o
)
(3.22)
where vrm is the returnmanifold volume, which includes humidifier volume second pass
vhm,2. The temperature of the gas in the return manifold, Trm . The outlet mass flow is a
function of the manifold pressure, Patm , and the pressure downstream from the manifold,
which is assumed to be fixed at ambient pressure, Patm .
Since the pressure drop between the return manifold and the ambient pressure is rela-
tively small, the equation of returnmanifold exit flow are similar of supplymanifold dynamic
equation, then
Wrm,o = krm,o (Prm −Pca) (3.23)
where ksm,o is the linear constant for supply manifold outlet flow, since the differential in
temperature occurs in the supply manifold because thermal effect of humidifier and using
Equation 3.18 and 3.19 and thermal assumptions described before, thus
dPrm
dt
= γR
Vrm
(
WcaTca −Wrm,oTrm
)
= γR
Vrm
(
WcaTst −Wrm,oTst
)
(3.24)
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3.5.6 HumidifierModel
Water management is critical for any fuel cell system. PEM FC membranes are extremely
sensitive to changes in water content and incoming reactant gas humidity. The fuel cell sys-
tem used to validate this model utilizes a simple humidity exchanger to transfer water va-
por from cathode exhaust stream into te cathode reactant air stream. The model utilizes an
effectiveness similar to a heat exchenger to model the humidity transfer, see Figure 3.6. A
static heat-and-moisture exchanger core comprises an enclosed shell structure having a plu-
rality of heat-and-moisture transfer members statically disposed therein in superposed and
spaced-apart relationship defining between each two adjacent members a static flow path.
The shell structure has a box-shaped configuration having four side walls and contains nu-
merous pairs of aligned openings in opposed side wall portions each pair opening into one
of the flow paths. If it is assumed that Thm ∼= Tst because of head transferees occurs into the
humidifier, we can determine the vapor pressure as
Humidifier Membrane
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Figure 3.6: Humidity Exchanger diagram.
HumidifyMass Balance
Fuel Cell Humidifiers are one of the key components in the fuel cell engine or balance of
plant. The humidifier provides heat and humidity to the incoming oxidant or hydrogen fuel
stream of fuel cells. Humidification of these gases is critical to fuel cell performance and
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reliability. If the membrane becomes too dry, proton transport in the membrane will be re-
duced and the oxygen reduction reaction at the cathode will decrease resulting in poor fuel
cell performance or failure
DuPoint’s planar membrane based humidification technology humidifies and heats the
fuel streams going to the fuel cell. This is achieved by flowing the incoming dry gas across
one side of awater permeable flat sheetmembrane andflowing the hot humidified air stream
from the fuel cell exhaust across the other side of the membrane. The membrane transfers
the heat and water vapour from the wet stream to the dry stream while preventing the gases
from crossing over
Air flow from compressor is humidified before entering the stack by injecting water into
the humidifier. The volume of the humidifier is taken as part of supply manifold volume. A
static model of humidifier is used to calculate the change of air humidity due to the addition
of water injected.
Since the maximum amount of water vapor that the air can hold depends on the tem-
perature and pressure of the air, the humidity ratio, , is not used, then is therefore more
accurate used the relative humidity, φ, which is defined as the ratio of the mole fraction of
the water vapor in the mixture to the mole fraction of vapor in a saturated mixture at the
same temperature and pressure. For full humidified is achieved when Pw = Psat , where Pv
is the partial pressure of the water and Psat is the saturated vapor pressure of the water, for
more detail see section ??.
Pv,sm =φsmPsatTatm (3.25)
Because of the mixture of humid air, the partial pressure is then calculated as
Pa,sm = Psm −Pv,sm (3.26)
Based on thermodynamic equation, see ??, can be calculated as
sm =
MvPv,sm
MaPa,sm
(3.27)
Themass flow rate of dry air is
Wa,sm = Wsm
1+sm
(3.28)
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Themass flow vapor
Wv,sm =Wsm −Wa,sm (3.29)
To know the desired stack inlet humidity, φdes , its assumed to be constant and not con-
trolled. Some works as Ramos et al. (2008) and del Real et al. (2007) assume that a properly
humidified process is done, so it is possible to assume as well that φdes ∼= 1. Whit the last as-
sumption, we can know the required amount of water injected to the flow rate, see Equation
3.30.
Wv,in j =
MvφdesPsatTst Wa,hm
MaPa,hm
−Wv,hm (3.30)
Then the calculation of inlet flow rate and pressure to cathode are
Wca,i =Wsm +Wv,in j (3.31)
and
Pca,i = Pa,sm +φdesPsatTst (3.32)
∼= Psm
Head Exchange Balance
Using Equation 3.3 and using the energy balance yields to
(
m˙O2,oCpO2 +m˙N2,oCpN2 +m˙H2O(v)CpH2O(v)
)
(Tst −Tex )= m˙air,caCpair
(
Tair,ca −Thm
)
(3.33)
Solving to stack exhaust temperature gives
Tex = Tst −
m˙air,caCpair (Thm −Tsm)(
m˙O2,oCpO2 +m˙N2,oCpN2 +m˙H2O(v)CpH2O(v)
) (3.34)
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Parameter Units Value
CpO2 J/(K gK ) 919.8
CpN2 J/(K gK ) 1041
CpH2O(v) J/(K gK ) 1865
Cpair J/(K gK ) 1004
Table 3.10: Specific heat value
3.5.7 Hydrogen Control Flow
3.5.8 Cooling SystemModel
Hydraulic diameter is defined as four times the channel cross section area divided by its
perimeter. For a typical rectangular channel is represented as:
DH =
2wcdc
wc +dc
(3.35)
were wc and dc are rectangular width and depth. Channel length is defined as
L = Acell
Nch (wc +dc )
(3.36)
where:
Acell cell active area m
2
Nch number of parallel channels
wc channel width m
wL space between the channels m
Heat Removal
In other to keep the desired temperature inside the cell, the heat generated as a by product
of the electrochemical reaction must be taken away from the stack basically by cooling with
a coolant flowing between the cells. Coolant may be deionized water, antifreeze coolant but
in the case for the Nexa PEM Fuel cell is used air as coolant.
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Stack Heat Balance
In general, energy of fuel (higher heating value) is converted into either electricity or heat:
Ener g yo f f uel reacted =Heatgener ated+Electr i ci t ygenerated
or
1
2F
HHHV ncell =Qreac + IstVst (3.37)
Heat generated in reaction(Qreac ), is then:
Qreac = (cst ·ncell −Vst )Ist (3.38)
Assuming that all the product water leaves the stack as liquid at 25 ◦C , which may be the
case if the inlet is fully saturatedat the stack operating temperature, the cst value is given as
1.482. If all of the product water leaves the stack as vapor, then the value of cst is then given
as 1.254. The previous equation is just an approximation.
Active Heat Removal
In terms of heat removal, a fuel cell stack it is considered as a heat exchanger with internal
heat generation. In order to simplify themodel, the walls of the fuel cell cooling channels are
considered as constant temperature and have the constant heat flux. The heat to be removed
by active cooling is represented by 3.38.
The heat transferred to the cooling fluid is represented as:
dQreac
d Ac
= h (Tst −Tc ) (3.39)
where, Tst and Tc is the fuel stack and cooling fluid temperature respectably, and Ac is called
as the heat exchange are o surface are of the cooling channels. Integrated over the entire heat
exchange surface, Ac , jus as heat exchanger, the equation 3.39 is posible to get
Qc =UAcLMTD (3.40)
where
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h=local heat transfer coefficient,Wm2◦C
U=overall heat transfer coefficient,Wm2◦C
LMTD=logarithmic mean temperature difference, ◦C
The logarithmic mean temperature (LMTD) is a temperature difference between the
stack body (Ts) and the cooling fluid, (TC ), and is described by equation 3.41.
LMTD = (Tst −Tc )i − (Tst −Tc)o
ln (Tst−Tc )i(Tst−Tc )i
(3.41)
The coefficient of convection heat transfer, h, depends on the Nusselt number, Nu, that
is, properties of the coolant, geometry of the passages, and flow characteristics see equation
3.42. The nusselt number represents the ratio of convection heat transfere for fluid inmotion
to conduction heat transfer for a motionless layer of fluid. Then based on the cells of Nexa it
is selected as
h =Nu k
DH
(3.42)
where
Nu=Nusselt Number
DH=Hydraulic diameter
3.6 Structural Analysis
3.7 PEM FC Linear Varying Parameter
3.8 Fault Modelling in a PEM Fuel Cell System:Fault Benchmark
In order to test the proposed methodology in the PEM FC system model descried before, a
set of common possible fault scenarios was considered and implemented in simulation as a
Fault Generator Block (FGB), see Figure 3.7. It is not only assumed that just single fault acts
over the system but also that selected fault acts over a specific part of the overall system. But,
on other hand, interaction occurs because of process dynamics and multiplicative effects of
the faults. Table 5.3 describes the set of faults which were considered. In the following it is
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described how these faults were included in the simulator:
Ballard Nexa© PEM Fuel Cell
xˆ= A (ϑk) xˆk +B (ϑk)uk+
L (ϑk)
(
yk − yˆ1
)
yˆk =C (ϑk) xˆk +D (ϑk)uk
yi
yˆi
f j
+
−
z
u
Figure 3.7: Fault Generator Block (FGB) and Fault Diagnosis System (FDS) implementation
diagram
ID Fault Description Type Magnitude
f1
There is a suddenly increase
of friction in themechanical Parametric ΔkR = 60%
component part of the compressor. Abrupt
f2
Degradation in the cells at stack is
presented because of contact-sensitivity Parametric 40%
reactions against to a reaction killer. Abrupt
f3
Hydrogen leak in the anode
is presented because of Parametric Anl , f = 2E +2
seal degradation. Abrupt
f4
A suddenly leak of hydrogen
is presented at the anode Parametric 80%
inlet manifold. Abrupt
f5
A suddenly leak of air
is presented at the inlet outlet Parametric 10%
supply manifold inlet manifold. Abrupt
Table 3.11: Description of the fault scenarios implemented in FGB.
Fault 1
The fault f1 is simulated with an increment ΔkR in the compressor motor resistance cmR .
The fault effect is translated in a change in the compressor torque τcm . Note that
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τcm =
ηcmkt
(Rcm +ΔRcm) (
vcm− (kv +Δkv )ωcm) (3.43)
is directly related to the state variableωcp andwhere: ηcm is themotormechanical efficiency,
kt is a motor constant, and ωcm is the compressor speed. Furthermore, the parameter is
related with the state of Psm because its dynamic is governed by the compressor inlet air
flow.
Wca,i = (ksm +Δksm)
(
Psm −Pcp
)
(3.44)
where Pcp is the compressor pressure and Psm is the supply manifold pressure. Because of
the change of mass flow of air is affected by the fault, the total mass balance across the FC
changes.
Fault 2
Fault f2 is presented as a contamination into the stack reducing the chemical reaction effi-
ciency by reducing of catalysis active area. The current density, i , is defined as cell current,
which equals stack current Ist (A), per cell active area, Af c (cm
2). The cell current is equal to
the stack current, Ist , because the stack is formed by connecting the fuel cells in series.
i = Ist
A f c ·ΔAf c
(3.45)
where ΔA f c is the active area contaminated.
Because of the majors voltage drops are associated with current density for non-linear
relations, see Larminie and Dicks (2003), current density is an important issue for total stack
voltage
vst = n× [E −vact −vohm −vconc ] (3.46)
where E is the open circuit voltage and vact , vohm . Finally vconc are activation loss, ohmic
loss and concentration loss, respectively. Reduction in activation area caused by fault f5, a
fuel cell voltage will be presented.
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Fault 3
The termWH2,nl introduced in (??) represents the natural leak from the anode of the fuel cell
stack. This leak is always present due to the physical stack sealing design. It is assumed that
the natural leak is governed by a standard orifice relation through an effective area, Anl . This
parameter has been obtained in ?). In order to simulate a degradation in the seal a change in
Anl is used as Anl , f = Anl f3.
WH2,nl =
Anl , f Pan√
Ranφan
P (r 1/γ)
(
2γ
γ−1[1−P
γ−1
γ
r ]
)1/2
(3.47)
where Pr = Pan/Patm is the pressure ratio across the assumed leak and the anode gas con-
stant, Ran , is calculated through the universal gas constant, R as follows
Ran =R/(yH2MH2 + (1− yH2 )MH2O) (3.48)
where the molar fraction of hydrogen in the anode is given by
yH2 =
Pan−φanPsatT=st
Pan
(3.49)
Fault 4
This fault is simulated as mass balance in the hydrogen inlet flow, as follows
WH2, f =WH2,i −WH2, f f4 (3.50)
Fault 5
This fault appears at the cathode inlet flow. Because this fault is considered as a leak, it is
introduced in themass balance, as fault f4, as follow
Whm, f =Whm,i −Whm,i f5 (3.51)
Note that the amount of air that does not enter into the system will not only be created a
abrupt change in the total mass balance, wheremO2 ,mN2 state variable aremainly involved,
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but also a system pressure change.
CHAPTER 4
FAULT DETECTION
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Robust fault detection
4.3 Model uncertainty approximation
4.3.1 Uncertainty propagation using sets
This thesis deals with the problem to estimate uncertainty using some of the following ap-
proaches
• Direct image of an interval function propagation. State observation of interval systems
implies the computation of the interval image of the state space function.
• Inverse image of an interval function propagation. Set-membership parameter estima-
tion implies the inverse image of the interval measurements.
• Direct and inverse image of interval functions propagation. Set-membership state esti-
mation implies the intersection of the of the interval image of the state space function
and inverse image of the interval measurements.
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In general, the computation of exact direct and inverse images of interval functions is
very difficult since the exact shape is very complex to be described in a computer. So, typi-
cally some simple approximating set is used to bound the exact uncertainty set. In the set-
membership literatureM. et al. (1996), several families of approximating sets have been con-
sidered as interval boxes, ellipsoids, paralletopes or zonotopes, see Figure 4.1
(a) Ellipsoid (b) Parallelotope (c) Polytope (d) Zonotope
Figure 4.1: Distinct approximating sets used in the set-membership literature.
In the current thesis, the parameter (or state) sets are bounded with zonotopes, which
include as a special case parallelotopes.
Given a set X, in the literature, inner X and outer X approximations has been proposed
such that:
X⊂X⊂X (4.1)
In order to guarantee that the exact uncertainty set is contained in the approximated set in
this thesis outer approximations would be preferred. When using the outer approximating of
set, instead of its exact representation, to propagate uncertainty using some known function
f , the propagation algorithm should guarantee that
f (X)⊂ f (X) (4.2)
If the uncertainty is propagated by the iterative application of f, since the overestimation
of the wrapped set is proportional to its radius, a spurious growth of the enclosures can re-
sult if the composition of wrapping and mapping through is iterated f (Kuhn, 1998). This
phenomena is known as thewrapping effect.
Set-membership identification/estimation methods have been the subject of a number
of publications. They can be classified according to how the approximation of the feasible set
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of parameters is represented or parameterized. In (Fogel and Huang, 1982) the set was over
bounded by an ellipsoid. Other authors have focused on orthotopic approximations, see
(Pearson, 1988). When using set-membership identification there is a trade-off between set
size (conservativeness) and complexity of the identification method. Simpler methods gen-
erally lead tomore conservative set estimates. In Vicino and Zappa (1996) it was claimed that
parallelotopic estimatesmaybe consistently better than ellipsoidal estimateswhile complex-
ity is similar.
Other authors have used set-membership algorithms applied to fault detection, see for
example Watkins and Yurkovich (1996). There, the feasible parameter set was approximated
with an ellipsoid. A numerically robust ellipsoid state estimation algorithm was presented
in (Lesecq et al., 2003). In (Tzes and Le, 1999) a fault detection scheme based on orthotopic
sets was presented. In (Kesavan and Lee, 2001) a consistency state-estimation based fault
detection scheme was presented which uses the recursive optimal bounding parallelotope
(ROBP) algorithm presented in (Chisci et al., 1998). They proposed a moving horizon strat-
egy where an outer bound of the initial state was propagated using the ROBP and a fault was
detected when no noise sequence within deterministic bounds could explain the observed
data. Uncertainty in process parameters was not considered. In Vicino and Zappa (1996), a
set-membership identification algorithmwaspresentedwhich results in a parallelotopic rep-
resentation of the parameter uncertainty for time-invariant systems. In (Bravo et al., 2006),
an extension of the previous algorithm based on zonotopes was presented to deal with time
variant systems. This thesis will show that the zonotope representation of the parameter un-
certainty combined with the above mentioned identification methods, is particularly suit-
able for fault detection based on consistency tests. Zonotopes provide better estimates of
the parameter set than other representations, e.g. boxes, ellipsoids, sub-pavings among oth-
ers (Bravo et al., 2006), leading directly to a better trade-off between false alarms andmissed
detections.
Zonotopes have appeared in set-membership approaches to fault detection before. In
(Combastel et al., 2003) an adaptive observer approach was presented where the residual
evaluation was performed using set-membership computations based on zonotopes. In
Ploix and Adrot (2006), parity relations were designed for linear systems with additive and
multiplicative uncertainty. Both of the mentioned methods treat linear system even though
the systemmatrices could be time-varying.
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4.3.2 Uncertainty approximation using sets
The physical systems are subjected to the presence of uncertainty. In some cases this uncer-
tainty is described as ranges and not by the exact values, for the variables and/or parameters
of the system. In this context, the use of a mathematical model for a determined purpose
(not only fault detection, but any another use, as state or parameter estimation, etc.) can be
formalized as a problem of set manipulation. In this section the bases of this type of formal-
ization are defined and their main characteristics. Set operations can be classified into two
main groups (Jaulin et al., 2001):
• Pure operations - those are the operations that only apply on sets: union, intersection,
etc.
• extended operations - those are operations of the set elements that are generalized to
apply directly on sets; they have sense in the use of sets in the representation of uncer-
tain variables.
Pure operations
Given X and Y two subsets of Rn , the elemental operations are defined as3
Union X∪Y Δ= {x |x ∈X∨x ∈Y } (4.3)
Intersection X∩Y Δ= {x |x ∈X∧x ∈Y } (4.4)
Difference X\Y
Δ= {x |x ∉X∧x ∈Y } (4.5)
WhereX andY are two subsets of RmandRn respectively, the cartesian product is defined
as:
X×Y Δ=
⎧⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝ x
y
⎞
⎠ ∈Rn+m ∣∣x ∈X∧y ∈Y
⎫⎬
⎭ (4.6)
If Z=X×Y, the projection of a subset Z1 of Z over X as:
3∨ represents the logic sum (OR), ∧ represent the logic product (AND)
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Projection
→
X (Z1)
Δ=
⎧⎨
⎩∈X
∣∣∣∣∣∣∃y ∈Y,
⎛
⎝ x
y
⎞
⎠ ∈Z1
⎫⎬
⎭ (4.7)
Finally, the order relations are defined:
Inclusion X⊂Y⇔∀x ∈X,x∈Y (4.8)
Equality X=Y⇔X⊂Y∧Y⊂X (4.9)
Extended operations
Let suppose that in an specific problem there are three uncertain variables, x, y y z, the
relation z = x+ y between them is known. If the exact values of x and y are known, x∗ and
y∗, it is possible to calculate the exact value of z, z∗, using the know relation, i.e. z∗ = x∗+y∗.
However, the uncertainty in the variables causes that the value of the first is only known as a
membership to a subset X, also for the second variable the membership to a set Y is known.
In this situation, the possible value of z∗ is limited to the calculation of the setZ of all possible
values of the known sets X and Y.
The last situation can be formalized as: Let ⊕ be a binary operator of X× in Z, the ex-
tended operator ⊕, of P(X×Y) is defined4 in P(Z), as:
X⊕Y Δ={x×y ∣∣x ∈X, y ∈Y} (4.10)
Functions
As for the extension to operations, it is possible to extend the concept of function to a set.
Let X and Y be two subsets of Rn and Rm respectively, and let f : Rn → Rm be a function, the
direct image ofX by f is defined as:
f (X)
Δ={y ∈Rm ∣∣∃x ∈X, f (x)= y} (4.11)
4P (X) represents the set of the parts ofX
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and the inverse image of Y by f as:
f−1 (Y)
Δ={y ∈Rn ∣∣∃x ∈X, f (x)= y} (4.12)
From the previous definitions, it is possible to deduce a set of properties; with X1,X2
subsets ofX andY1, Y2 subsets of Y, the following applies:
f (X1∩X2) ⊂ f (X1)∩ f (X2)
f−1 (X1∩X2) = f−1 (X1)∩ f−1 (X2)
f (X1∪X2) = f (X1)∪ f (X2)
f−1 (X1∪X2) = f−1 (X1)∪ f−1 (X2)
f
(
f−1 (Y)
) ⊂ Y
X1 ⊂ f−1 (Y ) ⇒ X1 ⊂ f−1 (f (X))
X1 ⊂X2 ⇒ f (X1)⊂ f (X2)
Y1 ⊂Y2 ⇒ f−1 (Y1)⊂ f−1 (X2)
X⊂X1×X2 ⇒ X⊂
→
Y1×
→
Y2
4.3.3 Background on zonotopes
Before start, some preliminary notations are introduced. An interval [a,b] is the set a ≤ x ≤ b.
The unitary interval is B= [−1,1]. A box is an interval vector. A unitary box in Rm , denoted as
Bm , is a box composed by m unitary intervals. Let us introduce some basic definitions from
the framework of zonotopes theory.
Definition 4.1 (Minkowski Sum). TheMinkowski sum of two setsX andY is defined as
X⊕Y= {x+y : x ∈X,y ∈Y} (4.13)
Definition 4.2 (Zonotope). Given a vector p ∈Rn andmatrixH ∈Rn×m, the set represented as:
X=p⊕HBm = {p+Hz : z ∈Bm} (4.14)
is called a zonotope of orderm and corresponds to theMinkowski sum of the segments defined
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by the columns of matrix H. In this expression, Bm is an unitary box composed by m unitary
intervals
The orderm is a measure for the geometrical complexity of the zonotopes. For instance,
Figure 4.2 shows the construction of a zonotope from a sequence of values ofm. Asm tends
to be greater, the zonotope topology is more complex.
A parallelotope is a zonotope with n =m. Given the parallelotope P= p⊕HBn , where the
H ∈Rn×n is invertible,P can be rewritten asP= {x : ∥∥H−1x−H−1p∥∥∞ ≤ 1}. Themathematical
representation of an n−dimensional ellipsoid is E= {x : (x−x0)T H(x−x0)≤ 1} where n×n
matrix H is positive definite. Finally, a polytope is a set that can be represented with linear
inequalities, P= {x : Ax ≤ b}
Y X
Z
 
(a) m = 2
Y X
Z
 
(b) m = 3
Y
X
Z
(c) m = 7
Y
X
Z
(d) m = 15
Figure 4.2: Zonotope scheme
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4.3.4 Zonotopes operations
For the implementation of the fault detection and fault tolerance evaluation techniques pre-
sented in this thesis, mainly the next operations on zonotopes are needed:
Interval hull of a zonotope
The interval hull X of a closed set X is the smallest interval box that contains X. Given a
zonotopeX= p⊕HBm , its interval hull can be easily computed by evaluating p⊕HBm , for all
i = 1..n:
X= {x : ∣∣xi −pi ∣∣≤‖Hi‖1} (4.15)
whereHi is i th-row ofH, and xi and pi are i th components of x and p, respectively.
Image of a zonotope through a linear transformation
Consider a zonotope represented by X= p⊕HBm where p ∈ Rn is a vector andH ∈Rn×m is a
matrix. The image of a zonotope through a linear transformationM ∈ Rn×n is a zonotope Y
defined by:
Y=q⊕NBm (4.16)
where: q=MP andN=MH
Checking consistency of a zonotope with a strip
Given a new data point
{
y (k)
}
at time instant k , regressor, the strip Fk ={
x ∈Rn : ∣∣cT x−y∣∣≤σ}, where σ measurement noise and y is the measurement output
of the system. Assuming that Fk ⊆ X where X = p⊕HBm is a zonotope, consistency can be
assessed by checking if
X∩Fk = (4.17)
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This check is very easy to perform using the following definition:
Definition 4.3. Given a zonotope X = p⊕HBm and a vector c, the zonotope support strip is
defined by FS = x : qd ≤⊕cT x≤ qu where qd and qu satisfy
qu =max
x∈X
cT x and qd =min
x∈X
cT x (4.18)
where is easily calculated as
qu = cTp+
∥∥HT c∥∥1 (4.19)
qd = cTp−
∥∥HT c∥∥1 (4.20)
where ‖·‖1 is the 1-norm of a vector.
Then, calculating the constants qu and qd , the intersection between X and Fk is empty if
and only if FS ∩Fk or qu < y(k)σ −1 or
y(k)
σ
+1< qd This condition of inconsistency for a SISO
model was reported by Vicino and Zappa (1996).
Intersection between a zonotope and a strip
Definition 4.4. Given a zonotopeX= p⊕HBm and a strip Fk = x : qa ≤ cT x≤ qb, the zonotope
tight strip is obtained by S = Fk ∩FS, where FS is the zonotope support strip defined by c and
X.
Given the zonotope X= p⊕HBr , the stripS= {x ∈Rn : ∣∣cT x−d∣∣≤ 1} and vector λ ∈Rn , if
X =X, then
X∩S⊆ Xˆ= pˆ (λ)⊕ Hˆ (λ)Br+1 (4.21)
where:
pˆ(λ) = p+λ(d−cTp) (4.22)
Hˆ(λ) = [(I−λcT )Hσλ] (4.23)
84 Chapter 4 : Fault Detection
It is possible to choose the parameter vector λ in such a way that a size criterion for the
obtained bound is minimized. Here, we use the method based on the Frobenius norm pro-
posed in [3]. Taking into account that the segments of Xˆ= pˆ(λ)⊕ Hˆ(λ)Br+1 are represented
by means of the columns of matrix Hˆ (λ), a measure of the size of Xˆ is the Frobenius norm of
Hˆ(λ).
λ= HH
T c
cTHHT c+σ2 (4.24)
Intersection between two zonotopes
Given two zonotopes X1 = p1⊕H1Br1 andX2 =P2⊕H2Br2 andmatrix E, let us define
pˆ(E) = Ep1+ (I−E)p2 (4.25)
Hˆ(E) = [EH1 (I−E)H2] (4.26)
then
X1∩X2 ⊆ Xˆ (E) (4.27)
Xˆ (E) = pˆ(E)⊕ Hˆ(E)Br1+r2 (4.28)
To reduce the size of the intersection zonotope Xˆ (E), a convex optimization problem is
solved. If H1i and H2 j (with i = 1, . . . ,m1, j = 1, . . . ,m2) are the columns of matrices H1 and
H2, the function to be minimized is:
f (E) =
m1∑
i=1
(EH1i )
T (EH1i )+
m2∑
j=1
(
H2 j −EH2 j
)T (H2 j −EH2 j ) (4.29)
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4.4 ROBUST FAULT DETECTIONUSING INTERVAL OBSERVERS
As it was mentioned before, the most common approach to deal with the robustness prob-
lem in the Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) community is based on the decoupling princi-
ple. Using this approach, the residual is designed to be insensitive to unknown disturbances,
whilst sensitive to faults using the unknown input observer, eigne-structure assignment pro-
posed by Chen and Patton (1999) or structured parity equations proposed by Gertler. (1998).
However, the robustness problem with respect to modeling errors is more difficult to solve,
because its distribution matrix is normally unknown and should be estimated, being many
times time varying. Moreover, there might be too many disturbances to be decoupled due
to the lack of freedom degrees. An alternative strategy is to consider modeling errors as un-
knowndisturbances, and topropagate andbound their effect on the residual, using for exam-
ple interval methods as in Puig et al. (2002b). On the other hand, process and measurement
noises are usually modeled stochastically using restrictive assumptions concerning the dis-
tribution law (the typical assumption is a zeromeanwhite noise). However, inmany practical
situations only bounds on the noise signals are available as in M. et al. (1996). This approach
is used to describe noise signals in this chapter. Unfortunately, the set of states obtained
propagating parametric and noise bounded uncertaintymay become extremely complex. In
the literature several approximating sets and related operations have been proposed to en-
close and propagate the set of possible states. In (Witczak, 2007), a state estimator based on
enclosing the set of states by the smallest ellipsoid is proposed using the algorithmsproposed
by Maksarov and Norton (1996). However, in this approach only additive uncertainty is con-
sidered, but not the multiplicative uncertainty introduced by modeling uncertainty located
in the parameters. Here, both types of uncertainties are considered as in Rinner andWeiss
(2004), but there only system trajectories obtained from the uncertain parameter interval
vertices are considered, assuming that the monotonicity property holds. In this chapter,
interval observers based on enclosing the set of states by zonotopes are presented without
assuming anymonotonicity property and considering the whole set of possible trajectories.
4.4.1 Interval observers
System set-up
Let us consider the following discrete-time linear system:
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xk+1 = A (ϑk)xk +B (ϑk)uk +Edk +wk (4.30)
yk = C (ϑk)xk +D (ϑk)uk +vk (4.31)
where
• xk ∈ Rnx , uk ∈ Rnu , yk ∈ Rny and d ∈ Rnd , are state, input, output and unknown input,
vectors of dimension nx, nu, ny and nd respectively.
• vk ∈ Rnv and w ∈ Rnw are measurement and process noise of dimension nv = ny and
nw = nx respectively; that are considered unknown but bounded, i.e. vk ∈ Vk and
wk ∈Wk , whereVk andWk are interval boxes:
– Vk =
{
vk ∈Rnv
∣∣vk ≤ vk ≤ vk }
– Wk =
{
wk ∈Rnv
∣∣wk ≤wk ≤wk }
• A (ϑk) and B (ϑk) are the state space matrices and ϑk is a vector of uncertain time-
varying parameters of dimension p with their values bounded by an interval box:5 Θ={
ϑ ∈Rp
∣∣∣ϑk ≤ϑk ≤ϑk }
• C is the output equation matrix.
• E stands for the unknown input distributionmatrix and represents the influence of the
unknown disturbances on the system. In this chapter as a first approach, it is assumed
to be a known matrix. It is let as a future work considering the associated modelling
errors, i.e. E (ϑk)
Decoupling the unknown input
The effect of unknown inputs can be tackled using several methods, as for example by intro-
ducing an additionalmatrix into the state estimation equation, which is then used for decou-
pling the unknown inputs effect on the state estimation error according to Chen and Patton
(1999), or transforming adequately the system in Eq. (4.29) into a system without the un-
known input as in (Keller, 1999). See (Hui and Zak, 2005) for a more in depth study of design
5This type of model is known, in the literature, as interval model. See, Puig et al. (2002b), Rinner andWeiss
(2004)
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methods for unknown input observers. In any case, the necessary condition for the existence
of a solution to the unknown input decoupling problem (See (Chen and Patton, 1999)):
r ank (CE)= r ank (E)= nd (4.32)
If the condition expressed in Eq. (4.32) is satisfied, then it is possible to calculateO= (CE)+ =[
(CE)T (CE)
]−1
(CE)T , where (·)+ stands for the pseudo-inverse of its argument. Then, bymul-
tiplying Eq. (4.31) byO, it is straightforward to show that
dk =O
[
yk+1−C (A (ϑk)xk +B (ϑk)uk +wk )−vk+1
]
(4.33)
Using Eqs. (4.29) and (4.33), then
xk+1 =A (ϑk)xk +B (ϑk)uk +Eyk+1+wk (4.34)
where
A (ϑk) = (I−EOC)A (ϑk)
B (ϑk) = (I−EOC)B (ϑk)
E = EO
wk = (I−EOC)wk −Evk+1
The interval observation principle
Let the model for the state estimator of the system given by Eq. (4.34), once the unknown
input is decoupled, be a Luenberger observer formulated as
xˆk+1 = A (ϑk) xˆk +B (ϑk)uk +Edk +wk +K
(
yk − yˆk
)
(4.35)
yˆk = C (ϑk) xˆk +D (ϑk) uˆk +vk (4.36)
where K is the observer gain that has to be designed in order to stabilize the observer
given by Eq. (4.35) and Eq. (4.36) for all ϑk ∈Θ.
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Definition 4.5 (Exact uncertain estimated state set). Consider the state estimator given by
Eqs.(4.35) and (4.36), an initial compact set X0 and a sequence of measured inputs
(
u j
)k−1
0
and outputs
(
y j
)k
0 . The exact uncertain estimated state set at time k is expressed by
Xk =
{
xˆk :
(
xˆ j =A
(
ϑ j−1
)
xˆ j−1+B
(
ϑ j−1
)
uˆ j−1+w j−1+Ey j +K
(
y j−1− yˆ j−1
))k
j=1 ,(
yˆ j−1 =Cxˆ j−1+Dxˆ j−1+v j−1
)k
j=1 |x0, xˆ0 ∈X0,
(
ϑ j−1 ∈Θ,w j−1 ∈W j−1,v j−1 ∈V j−1
)k
j=1
}
(4.37)
The uncertain state set described in Definition 4.5 at time k can be computed approx-
imately by admitting the rupture of the existing relations between variables of consecutive
time instants6. This makes possible to compute an approximation of this set from the ap-
proximate uncertain state set at time k −1. Because the exact set of estimated states would
be difficult to compute, one straightforward way to bound this set is using a box (interval
hull) as in (Puig et al., 2002b), a zonotope as in (Alamo et al., 2005) or other geometric regions
easy to compute as in (Jaulin et al., 2001). Before introducing such algorithm an additional
definition is introduced.
Definition 4.6 (Approximated uncertain estimated state set). Consider a system given by
Eqs.(4.35) and (4.36), the set of uncertain states at time k −1, Xk−1 and the input/output val-
ues
(
uk−1,yk−1,yk
)
. Then, the approximated set of estimated states at time k based on the
measurements up to time k −1 is defined as
Xek =
{
xˆk :A
(
ϑ j−1
)
xˆ j−1+B
(
ϑ j−1
)
uˆ j−1+w j−1+Ey j +K
(
y j−1− yˆ j−1
)
,
yˆ j−1 =Cxˆ j−1+Dxˆ j−1+v j−1 |x0, xˆ0 ∈X0,
(
ϑ j−1 ∈Θ,w j−1 ∈W j−1,v j−1 ∈V j−1
}
(4.38)
Analogously, considering measurement equation in Eqs. (4.35) and (4.36) the approxi-
mated set of estimated outputsYek can be determined.
Using previous definition, the set of estimated states (or outputs) introduced in Defini-
tion 4.6 will be approximated iteratively using zonotopes. From these zonotopes, an interval
6However, the problem of uncertainty propagation (wrapping effect) could appear when this set is approxi-
mated in this way because of the accumulation of overestimation along the simulation time and deriving in an
explosion of uncertainty
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for each state variable can also be obtained by computing the interval hull of the zonotope.
The sequence of interval hullsXek with k ∈ [0,N ] will be called the interval observer estima-
tion of the system given by Eqs. (4.35) and (4.36) . Analogously, the sequence of interval hulls
Yek k can be obtained. Following previous idea, Algorithm 4.1 is proposed to determine an
approximation of set of uncertain estimated states.
Algorithm4.1 Interval Observer using Set Computations
1: k← 1
2: Xek ⇐X0
3: while N ≤ k do
4: Obtain input-output data {uk,yk}
5: Compute the approximated set of estimated states, Xek
6: Compute the approximated set of estimated outputs, Yek
7: Compute the interval hull of the approximated set of estimated states,Xek =
[
xk ,xk
]
8: Compute the interval hull of the approximated set of estimated outputs,Yek =
[
y
k
,yk
]
9: k← k +1
10: end while
4.4.2 Interval observer design
The design of the interval observer in Eqs. (4.35) and (4.36) can be solved with the LMI pole
placement technique (Chilali and Gahinet, 1996), that allows to locate the poles of the ob-
server in a subregion of the left half-plane using a LMI region. Consider a given 2d × 2d
Hermitian matrix defined as
R=
⎡
⎣ R00 R10
R∗10 R11
⎤
⎦ ∈C2d×2d ,R11 ∈Cd×d ≥ 0 (4.39)
and the feasibility set of an associated LMI defined as
D = {s ∈C :R00+ (R10s)H +R11s∗s < 0} (4.40)
where (R10s)H denotes the Hermitian transpose of R10s. Sets defined according Eqs.
(4.39) and (4.40) are called D-regions in Chilali and Gahinet (1996). Moreover, the intersec-
tion of D-regions is a D-region, allowing to characterize some multiple temporal specifica-
tions.
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Example 4.1. For the vertical left half-plane characterized by x < λ, the associated matrix R
is
R=
⎡
⎣ −2λ 1
1 0
⎤
⎦ (4.41)
while for an open disk with center c = c1+c2i and radius r is
R=
⎡
⎣ c21 +c22 − r 2 −c1+c2i
−c1−c2i 1
⎤
⎦ (4.42)
Using these formulas, it is easy to verify that the classical stability regions for continuous-
time (left half-plane) and discrete-time (origin-centered unitary disk) systems are associated
to thematrices
Rct =
⎡
⎣ 0 1
1 0
⎤
⎦ ; Rdt =
⎡
⎣ −1 0
0 1
⎤
⎦ (4.43)
In particular, let consider a disk LMI region called D defined by center c (in this case
c = c1 and c2 = 0) and a radius r such that (c + r ) < 1. The two scalars c and r are used to
determine a specific region included in the unit circle where the observer eigenvalues will
be placed. Therefore, this circular region puts a lower bound on both the exponential decay
rate and the damping ratio of the closed-loop response. The design of the interval observer
in Eqs. (4.35) and (4.36) such that the observer poles are placed in this LMI region requires to
find for each vertex of the parameter space:ϑ j ∈
[
ϑ jϑ
j]
with j ∈ [1, . . . ,2p ], the observer gain
K and unknown symmetric matrix X=XT > 0 that satisfies the following LMI:
⎛
⎝ −rX cX+
(
A0
(
ϑ j
)T
X
)T
(
c +A0
(
ϑ j
)T
X
)T −rX
⎞
⎠< 0 (4.44)
that corresponds to Eq. (4.40) in Chilali and Gahinet (1996) withmatrixA being the trans-
pose of the observer matrix A0
(
ϑ j
)=A(ϑ j )−KC.
Note Eq. (4.44) is a Bilinear Matrix Inequality (BMI) which cannot be solved with LMI
classical tools. But substitutingW=KTX it is possible to transform it into:
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⎛
⎝ −rX cX+XT A (ϑ j )−WTC(
c +A(ϑ j )T )X−WTC −rX
⎞
⎠< 0 (4.45)
Then, the design procedure boils down to solve the LMI Eq.(4.45) and determine the ob-
server gain as L= (WX−1)T .
4.5 Fault detection using interval observers
The application of observers to fault detection consists in testing whether themeasured out-
put is consistent with the one by an observer using a faultless model. If an inconsistency is
detected, the existence of a fault is proved. In the case of assuming bounded noise, the mea-
surement can be considered to be in the interval
[
yk
]
. Then, the fault detection test can be
stated as
[
yk
]∩Yek =  (4.46)
whereYek is set of predicted outputs that can be obtained using Algorithm 4.1.
4.5.1 Implementation of interval observers using zonotopes
Algorithm4.2 implements fault detection using interval observers and the fault detection test
presented in Eqs. (4.35) and (4.36).
To implement interval observers using zonotopes, it should be noticed that using Eq.
(4.46) as the expression of the estimator model, it can be viewed as a discrete-time system
with one input, then
xˆk+1 =
(
A (ϑk)−KC
)
xˆk +
[
B (ϑk) E I K K
]
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
uk
yk+1
wk
yk
vk
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(4.47)
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Algorithm 4.2 Fault Detection using Interval Observers
1: f aul t← FALSE
2: k← 0
3: Xek ⇐X0
4: while f aul t = FALSE do
5: Obtain input-output data {uk,yk}
6: Compute the approximated set of estimated states, Xek
7: Compute the approximated set of estimated outputs,Yek
8: Compute the interval hull of the approximated set of estimated states,Xek =
[
xk ,xk
]
9: Compute the interval hull of the approximated set of estimated outputs,Yek =
[
y
k
,yk
]
10: if [yk]∩Yek = then
11: f aul t← TRUE
12: end if
13: k ← k +1
14: end while
Or, equivalently:
xˆk+1 =A(ϑk)0 xˆk +B0 (ϑk)u0k (4.48)
where:
A0 = A(ϑk)−KC (4.49)
B0 =
[
B (ϑ)k E I K K
]
(4.50)
u0k =
[
uk yk+1 wk yk vk
]T
(4.51)
Then, the problem of interval observation can be formulated as a problem of interval
simulation and requires characterizing the set X ek . This set can be viewed as the direct image
evaluation of Eq. (4.47) and can be implemented using zonotopes.
According to Algorithm 4.2, interval observers involves a bounding operation applied to
the set of estimated states Xek .
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Implementation of prediction set step
The prediction set step requires characterizing the set Xek . This set can be viewed as the
direct image evaluation of f
(
xk ,ϑk ,wk
)=A0 (ϑk) xˆk +B (ϑk)u0k +wk . There are different algo-
rithms to bound such an image using sub-pavings, see in (Jaulin et al., 2001), ellipsoids, see
in (Maksarov and Norton, 1996) or zonotopes, see (Kuhn, 1998). To bound such image using
zonotopes the following result is used:
Theorem 4.1 (Zonotope Inclusion, see (Alamo et al., 2005) ). Consider a family of zonotopes
represented by X= p⊕MBm where p ∈ Rn is a real vector and M ∈ In×m is an interval matrix.
A zonotope inclusion  (X) is defined by:
 (X) = p⊕
[
mid
(
M G
)]⎡⎣ Bm
Bn
⎤
⎦
p⊕ JBn+m (4.52)
where G ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal matrix that satisfies: Gi i =
m∑
j=1
diam(Mi j )
2 , i = 1,2, . . . ,n. with
mid denotes the center anddiam the diameter of the interval according toMoore (1966). Under
this definition,X⊆ (X).
This prediction step aims at computing the zonotope Xek+1 that bounds the trajectory
of the system at instant k +1, from the previous approximating zonotope at time instant k ,
Xk , using the natural interval extension of Eq. (4.48) as suggested by (Moore, 1966) and the
zonotope inclusion operator, as a generalization of Kühn’s method, see (Kuhn, 1998):
Xek+1 =pk+1⊕Hk+1Br (4.53)
where:
pk+1 =mid
(
A0 (ϑk)
)
pk +mid
(
B0 (ϑk)
)
uk (4.54)
and
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Hk+1 =
[
J1 J2 J3
]
J1 = 
(
A0 (ϑk)Hk
)
J2 = pk
(
diam
(
A0 (ϑk)
)
/2
)
(4.55)
J3 = u0k
(
diam
(
B0 (ϑk)
)
/2
)
where J1 is calculated using the zonotope inclusion operator. It is important to notice that
the set of estimated states has an increasing number of segments generating the zonotope
Xek+1 using this method. In order to control the domain complexity, a reduction step is thus
implemented. Here we use the method proposed in (Combastel et al., 2003) to reduce the
zonotope complexity is used and described in the
Definition 4.7. Given the zonotope X = p⊕HBr ⊂ Rn and the integer s with ( n < s < r),
let Hˆ be the matrix resulting from reordering the H columns in decreasing Euclidean norm.
ThenX⊆ p⊕
[
HˆT Q
]
Bs , where HˆT is obtained from the first s-n columns ofmatrix Hˆ and
Q ∈Rn×n is a diagonal matrix that satisfies: Qi ,i =∑rj=s−n+1 ∣∣Hi j ∣∣ , i = 1, . . . ,n
Checking for intersection emptiness
The step 6 of Algorithm 4.2 requires to check if the intersection of
[
yk
]∩Yek , is not the empty
set, then the operation of checking consistency of a zonotope, Yek , with a strip, yk .
4.6 Residual Generation
The application of interval observers to fault detection involves testing whether the mea-
sured output is consistent with the one given by the observer using a faultless model and
parameter uncertainty. If an inconsistency is detected, the existence of a fault is proved.
The consistency match is based on generating a residual by comparing themeasurements of
physical variables yk of the process with their estimation yˆk provided by the observer:
rk = yk − yˆk (4.56)
where rk ∈ Rny is the residual set. The effect of the uncertain parameter ϑk on the observer
temporal response yˆ(k ,ϑk) can be determined computing the estimate output set Y
e
k using
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Algorithm ??. The effect of the uncertainty in a particular output can be bounded using an
interval as
yˆ(k)=
[
yˆ(k), yˆ(k)
]
(4.57)
The residual generated by Eq. (5.3) is not zero, even in a non-fault scenario when con-
sidering model uncertainty located in parameters. In order to solve this problem a pas-
sive robust approach based on adaptive threshold can be used. Thus, using this passive
approach, the effect of parameter uncertainty in residual r(k) is bounded by the interval
Horak and Guidance (1988),
r(k)∈ [r(k),r(k)] (4.58)
where
r(k)= yˆ(k)− yˆ(k); r(k)= yˆ(k)− yˆ(k) (4.59)
being yˆ(k) the nominal predicted output, using Eq. (??), and r(k),r(k) are the bounds of pre-
dicted output computed in Eq. (4.57). Then, the fault detection test using interval residuals
is expressed as
r(k)∉Rk (4.60)
where Rk is the set of residuals, the interval hullRk = [r 1,r 1]×·· ·× [r ny ,r ny ]. Alternatively
the fault detection test using interval observer outputs is computed as:
y(k)∉Yek (4.61)
where Yek is the set of predicted outputs that can be computed using Algorithm 4.1 and the
interval hull asYek = [y1, y1]×·· ·× [yny , yny ]
4.7 Threshold Design
4.8 Residual Evaluation
4.9 Summary
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CHAPTER 5
FAULT ISOLATION
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Relative sensitivity approach
The isolation approach presented in Section 2 uses a set of binary detection (Boolean) tests to
compose the observed fault signature. However, the use of binary codification of the resid-
ual produces a lack of information that can lead to wrong diagnosis when applied to dy-
namic systems. This derives in some faults that are not isolable because they present the
same theoretical binary fault signature (Puig et al., 2006). To avoid this problem is possible
to use other additional information associated with the relationship between the residuals
and faults, such as sign, sensitivity, and order or activation time, to improve the isolation
results (Puig et al., 2006).
In this work, a new method for fault diagnosis that tries to better exploit the informa-
tion provided by the fault residual is proposed for diagnosis system designing. According to
Gertler. (1998), the sensitivity of the residual to a fault is given by
S f =
∂r
∂ f
(5.1)
which is a transfer function that describes the effect on the residual (r) of a given fault (f ).
Sensitivity provides quantitative information about the effect of the fault on the residual and
qualitative information in their sense of variation (sign). The use of this information at the
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stage of diagnosis allows separating faults that although show the same theoretical binary
fault signature, they present different sensitivity values. In order to perform diagnosis, the
algorithm will use a theoretical fault sensitivity matrix FSMsensi t . Each value of this matrix,
denoted as Sri f j , contains the sensitivity of the residual ri to the fault f j . Although sensitivity
depends on time in case of a dynamic system, here the steady-state value after a fault oc-
currence is considered as it is also suggested in Gertler. (1998). However several simulation
results show a dynamic dependency on operating points for Sri f j matrix elements. In order
to perform real time diagnosis, the observed sensitivity Sori f j should be computed using the
current value of the residual ri (k) at operating point ϑk when a fault f (k) is detected.
ri (k)= Sori (ϑk) f (k) (5.2)
5.2.1 Relative fault sensitivity approach
From (5.1), it is possible to observe that in real time requires the knowledge of the fault mag-
nitude or an estimation of it at a specific operating point. To solve this problem, it is used a
new concept called relativity sensitivity rather than absolute sensitivity given in (5.3).
Theobserved relative fault sensitivity is defined as:
Srel ,ori rl =
Sori f j (ϑk)
Sorl f j (ϑk )
= ri (ϑk)
r j (ϑk)
(5.3)
which corresponds to the ratio of one residual ri (k) with respect to another specific one
(rl ). Then, the relative sensitivity will be insensitive to the unknow magnitude of the fault.
A new FSM , called FSMsensi trel (see Escobet et al. (2009)), which corresponds to theoretical
fault signature matrix based on relative sensitivity is then introduced. The elements of this
matrix Srel ,tri rl f j , is given by
Srel ,tri rl , f j =
Stri f j (ϑk)
Strl f j (ϑk)
= ∂ri (k)/∂ f j (k)(ϑk)
∂rl (k)/∂ f j (k)(ϑk)
(5.4)
In this case, for a set of n faults, a relative fault sensitivity matrix FSMsensi trel should be
used as shown in Table 5.3.
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f1 f2 · · · fn
r2/rl S
rel ,t
r2rl , f1
Srel ,tr2rl , f2 · · · S
rel ,t
r2rl , fn
r3/rl S
rel ,t
r3rl , f1
Srel ,tr3rl , f2 · · · S
rel ,t
r3rl , fn
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
rm/rl S
rel ,t
rmrl , f1
Srel ,trmrl , f2 · · · S
rel ,t
rmrl , fn
Table 5.1: Theoretical fault signature matrix using relative sensitivity respect to rl at ϑk
The diagnostic algorithm used to assess real-time observed relative sensitivities using
(5.3), is based on a ratio of residuals, will provide a vector in relative sensitivities space. The
vector generated will be compared with vectors of theoretical fault places stored into the
relative sensitivitymatrix FSMsensi trel . The theoretical fault signature vectorwith aminimum
distance with respect to the fault observed vector is postulated as the possible fault:
min=
{
dsf1(k), . . . ,d
s
fn
}
(5.5)
where the distance is calculated using the Euclidean distance between vectors
dsfn (k)= sqr t
⎛
⎝
(
Srel ,or2r1, f1 (ϑk)−S
rel ,t
r2r1, f1
(ϑk)
)2+ ...
+
(
Srel ,ormr1, fn (ϑk)−S
rel ,t
rmr1, fn
(ϑk)
)2
⎞
⎠ (5.6)
Algorithm 2 summarizes the fault isolation procedure.
Algorithm5.1 Fault Isolation
1: f aul t ← TRUE
2: k← k +1
3: while f aul t = TRUE do
4: Obtain input-output data {uk,yk}
5: Compute the approximated set of estimated outputs, using Algorism ?? step: 6 to 9.
6: Compute the Theoretical Sensitivity Dynamic for process output yn at f j , Strl f1 (ϑk)
7: Compute the Observed Sensitivity Dynamic for process output yn at f j , Sorl f1 (ϑk )
8: Compute the Euclidean distance between Theoretical and Observed Sensitivity,
dsfn (k)=
{
Strl fn (ϑk),S
o
rl fn
(ϑk )
}
9: Fault isolation→ f
10: end while
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5.3 Structured Residual
The isolation approach presented in Section ?? uses a set of binary detection (Boolean) tests
to obtain the observed fault signature. However, the use of binary codification of the residual
produces a lack of information that can lead to wrong diagnosis when applied to dynamic
systems. This derives in some faults are not isolable because they present the same theoreti-
cal binary fault signature Puig et al. (2006). To avoid this problem is possible to use additional
information associated with the relationship between the residuals and faults, such as sign,
sensitivity, and order or activation time, to improve the isolation results Puig et al. (2006).
5.3.1 Proposedmethodology
In this work, a new method for fault diagnosis system design is proposed that exploits the
information provided by the fault sensitivity in Eq. (5.5). Considering computational form
of the residual generator using Eq. (5.3) and input-output form of plant model with q−shift
expressed in terms of the effects caused by faults
r(k) = ro(k)+ (I−H(q−1,ϑ))(G fa (q−1, ϑ˜)fa(k)
+G fy (q−1, ϑ˜)fy (k))−G fu (q−1, ϑ˜)fu(k) (5.7)
where uo and yo are the faultless sensor signal, and are expressed as:
ro(k)=−G(q−1,ϑ)uo(k)+ (I−H(q−1,ϑ))yo(k) (5.8)
Sensitivity of the residual to an output sensor fault
Considering the residual internal form given by Eq. (5.15) and the fault residual sensitivity
definition given by Eq. (5.5), it is possible to compute the sensitivity for the case of an output
sensor fault, fy , which is given in q−transfer form by a transfer function matrix S f y with size
of ny ×ny , expressed as:
S f y (q
−1,ϑ)= (I−H(q−1,ϑ))G fy (q−1,ϑ) (5.9)
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The element of thismatrix S f y describes the sensitivity of the residual ri (k) regarding the
fault fy affecting the output sensor.
Sensitivity of the residual to an input sensor fault
The residual sensitivity to an input sensor fault, fu , is given by the transfer function matrix
S f u which size is ny ×nu. The dynamic residual sensitivity is computed as:
S f u(q
−1,ϑ)=−G fu (q−1,ϑ) (5.10)
Each element of this matrix S f u is related to one component of the residual vector r (k)=
ri (k) : i = 1,2, . . . ,ny while each column is related to one component of the input sensor fault
vector fu =
{
fu,l : l = 1,2, . . . ,nu
}
.
Sensitivity of the residual to an actuator fault
Repeating the analysis procedure used in the output sensor case, the residual sensitivity of
an actuator fault where S f a size is ny ×nu , fa :
S f a(q
−1,ϑ)= (I−H(q−1,ϑ))G fa (q−1,ϑ) (5.11)
Each element of this matrix S f a is related to one component of the residual vector
r (k) = ri (k) : i = 1,2, . . . ,ny while each column is related to one component of the actuator
fault vector fu =
{
fa,l : l = 1,2, . . . ,nu
}
.
5.3.2 Interval fault magnitude estimation
How the residual fault sensitivity, described in Eq. (5.15), determines the value of the LPV
interval residual at each instant when the observed system is affected by a already described
faults is expressed as
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r(k) = ro(k)+S fy
(
q−1,ϑk
)
fy (k)+ (5.12)
S fa
(
q−1,ϑk
)
fa(k)+S fu
(
q−1,ϑk
)
fu(k)
According to Gertler. (1998), the interval fault magnitude estimation boundaries consid-
ering model uncertainty (??), is given by
fh ∈ [fminh , fmaxh ] (5.13)
where
fminh (k) = min
ϑ∈Θ
{[
S fh
(
q−1,ϑ
)]−1}
r(k); h : a,u, y
fmaxh (k) = max
ϑ∈Θ
{[
S fh
(
q−1,ϑ
)]−1}
r(k); (5.14)
assuming that S fh is a square full rank matrix for all ϑ ∈ Θ, otherwise the pseudo inverse of
S fh should be used
5.4 additive fault
5.4.1 Fault Sensitivity Analysis
The isolation approach presented in Section ?? uses a set of binary detection (Boolean) tests
to compose the observed fault signature. However, the use of binary codification of the resid-
ual produces a lack of information that can lead towrong diagnosis when applied to dynamic
systems. This derives in some faults that are not isolable because they present the same the-
oretical binary fault signature Puig et al. (2006). To avoid this problem is possible to use ad-
ditional information associated with the relationship between the residuals and faults, such
as sign, sensitivity, and order or activation time, to improve the isolation results Puig et al.
(2006).
5.4 : additive fault 103
5.4.2 Proposedmethodology
In this work, a new method for fault diagnosis system design is proposed that exploits the
information provided by the sensitivity in the case where the fault magnitude is unknown.
Sensitivity of the residual to an output sensor fault
Considering computational form of the residual generator using Eq. (??) and input-output
format of plant model with q−shift expressed in terms of the effects caused by faults
r(k) = ro(k)+ (I−H(q−1,ϑ))(G fa (q−1, ϑ˜)fa(k)
+G fy (q−1, ϑ˜)fy (k))−G fu (q−1, ϑ˜)fu(k) (5.15)
where
ro(k)=−G(q−1,ϑ)uo(k)+ (I−H(q−1,ϑ))yo(k) (5.16)
Considering the residual internal formgiven by Eq. (5.15) and considering the fault resid-
ual sensitivity definition given by Eq. (5.5), it is possible to compute the sensitivity for the
case of an output sensor fault, fy , which is given in q−transfer form by a transfer function
matrix S f y with size of ny ×ny , expressed as:
S f y (q
−1,ϑ) =
(
I+Cy (ϑ)(qI−Ay (ϑ))−1)By (ϑ)
Dy (ϑ)
= (I+Hyr (q−1,ϑ))−1Fy (ϑ) (5.17)
where Ay (ϑ) = A(ϑ)−L(ϑ)C(ϑ), By = Fy (ϑ)fy , Cy (ϑ) = C(ϑ), Dy (ϑ) = D(ϑ) and Hyr (q−1,ϑ) =
Cy
(
qI−Ay (ϑ))By (ϑ)+Dy (ϑ).
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Sensitivity of the residual to an input sensor fault
The residual sensitivity to an input sensor fault, fu , is given by the transfer function matrix
S f u which dimation is ny ×nu. The dynamic residual sensitivity is computed as:
S f u(q
−1,ϑ) =
(
I+Cu(ϑ)(qI−Au(ϑ))−1)Bu(ϑ)
= (I +Hur (q−1,ϑ))−1Fu(ϑ) (5.18)
where Au(ϑ) = A(ϑ) − L(ϑ)C(ϑ), Bu = B(ϑ) − L(ϑ)D(ϑ),Cu(ϑ) = C(ϑ), Du(ϑ) = D(ϑ) and
Hur (q
−1,ϑ)=Cu (qI−Au(ϑ))Bu(ϑ)+Du(ϑ).
In order to perform diagnosis, the algorithm uses a theoretical fault sensitivity matrix
(FSMsensi t ), see Table 5.2. Each value of this matrix, denoted as Sri f j , contains the sensitivity
of the residual ri to the fault f j . Each value of this matrix, denoted as Sri f j , contains the
sensitivity of the residual ri to the fault f j .
ri/ f j f1 f2 · · · fm
r1 S11 S12 · · · S1m
r2 S21 S22 · · · S2m
...
...
...
...
...
rn Sn1 Sn2 · · · Snm
Table 5.2: Theoretical Fault Sensitivity signature matrix
Although sensitivity depends on time in case of a dynamic system, here the steady-state
value after a fault occurrence is considered as it is also suggested by Gertler. (1998).
In order to perform real time diagnosis, the observed sensitivity Sori f j should be computed
using the current value of the residual ri (k) when a fault f (k) is detected. But, this requires
the knowledge of the faultmagnitude or an estimation of it. To solve this problem, this paper
attempts to design the diagnosis using the concept of relative sensitivity rather than absolute
sensitivity given by (5.5). The observed relative fault sensitivity is defined as
Srel ,o
ri ,rl , f j
=
Sri f j
Srl f j
= ri (k) f j (k)
rl (k) f j (k)
= ri (k)
rl (k)
(5.19)
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where
r il = maxi=1,...,m
(∣∣Sri fm ∣∣) (5.20)
The residual (rl ) for each f j to be used as relative factor in Eq. (5.19), that guarantees the best
isolation performance it is based on theoretical sensitivity value from one fault to another,
see Eq. (5.20). Using the concept of relative sensitivity, the theoretical relative fault signature
matrix FSMrelsensi t presented in Table II is introduced.
f1 f2 · · · fm
r2/rl S
rel ,t
r2rl , f1
Srel ,tr2rl , f2 · · · S
rel ,t
r2rl , fm
r3/rl S
rel ,t
r3rl , f1
Srel ,tr3rl , f2 · · · S
rel ,t
r3rl , fm
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
rm/rl S
rel ,t
rmrl , f1
Srel ,trnrl , f2 · · · S
rel ,t
rnrl , fm
Table 5.3: Theoretical fault signature matrix using relative sensitivity respect to rl
The diagnostic Algorithm 5.2 computes in real-time the observed relative sensitivities
(5.19) as a ratio of residuals providing a point vector in the relative sensitivities space. The
vector generated will be compared with vectors of theoretical fault places stored into the
relative sensitivity matrix FSMrelsensi t . The theoretical fault signature vector with a minimum
distance with respect to the fault observed vector is postulated as the possible fault as:
min
{
dsf1(k), . . . ,d
s
fn
}
(5.21)
where the distance is calculated using the Euclidean distance between vectors
dsfn (k)= sqr t
⎛
⎝
(
Srel ,or2r1, f1 (ϑk)−S
rel ,t
r2r1, f1
(ϑk)
)2+ ...
+
(
Srel ,ormr1, fn (ϑk)−S
rel ,t
rmr1, fn
(ϑk)
)2
⎞
⎠ (5.22)
Algorithm 2 summarizes the fault isolation procedure.
5.5 Directional Residuals
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Algorithm 5.2 Fault Isolation
1: f aul t← TRUE
2: k← k +1
3: while f aul t = TRUE do
4: Obtain input-output data {uk,yk}
5: Compute the approximated set of estimated outputs, using Algorithm ?? step: 6 to 9.
6: Compute the Theoretical Sensitivity Dynamic for process output yn at f j , Strl f j (ϑk)
7: Compute the Observed Sensitivity Dynamic for process output yn at f j , Sorl f j (ϑk )
8: Compute the Euclidean distance between Theoretical and Observed Sensitivity,
dsfn (k)=
{
Strl fn (ϑk),S
o
rl fn
(ϑk)
}
9: Fault isolation→ f
10: end while
CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDY
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Nexa non-linearmodel
6.3 Fault Benchmark
6.4 Fault diagnosis
6.4.1 Fault Detection
6.4.2 Fault Isolation
6.5 Fault Identification
107
108 Chapter 6 : Case Study
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
109
110 Chapter 7 : Conclusions and FutureWork
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Emami-Naemi A, M.M. Akhter, and S.M. Rock. Effect of model uncertainty on failure detec-
tion: the threshold selection. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, AC-33:1106–1115,
1988.
O. Adrot and J.M. Flaus. Trajectory computation of dynamic uncertain systems. In In Pro-
ceedings of Conference on Decision and Control, Hawaii. USA., 2003.
International Energy Agency. Prospects for hydrogen and fuel cells. International Energy
Agency, illustrated edition, 2005.
T. Alamo, J.M. Bravo, and E.F. Camacho. Guaranteed state estimation by zonotopes. Auto-
matica, 41(6):1035–1043, 2005.
M. Basseville. Detecting changes in signals and systems:a survey. Automatica, 24(3):309–326,
1988.
M. Basseville and A. Benvenista. Detection of Abrupt Changes in Signals and Dynamics Sys-
tems. Springer-Verlag, 1986.
M. Basseville and I.V. Nikirov. Detection of abrupt changes: theory and applications. Prentice
Hall, 1993.
M.S. Bazaraa, H.D. Sherali, and C.M. Shetty. Nonlinear Programming. John Wiley & Sons,
New York, 1993.
R. V. Beard. Failure Accommodation in Linear Through Self Reorganizing. PhD thesis, MIT,
USA, 1979.
M. Blanke, M. Kinnaert, J. Lunze, andM. Staroswiecki. Diagnosis and Fault-Tolerant Control.
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2003.
Meherwa P Boyce. Gas Turbine Engineering Handbook. Gulf Publishing, Houston, Texas,
1982.
111
112 BIBLIOGRAPHY
J.M. Bravo, T. Alamo, and E.F. Camacho. Bounded error identification of systems with time
varying parameters. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 51:1144–1150, July 2006.
Eduards C., Spurgeon S.K, and Patton R.J. Sliding mode observers for fault detection and
isolation. Automatica, 36:541–553, 2000.
Carrette, Friedrich, and Stimming. Fuel cells-fundamentals and applications. Wiley Inter-
Science, 2001.
I. C. Chang, C. C. Yu, and C. T. Liou. Model-based approach for fault diagnosis: Part i princi-
ples of deepmodel algorithm (dma). Ind. Eng. Chem. Res., 33:1542–1555, 1994.
J. Chen and R.J. Patton. Robust Model-Based Fault Diagnosis for Dynamic Systems. Marcel
Dekker, 1999.
J. Chen and H. Y. Zhang. Parity vector approach for detecting failures in dynamic systems.
International Journal of Systems Science, 21(4):756–770, 1990.
M. Chilali and P. Gahinet. h∞ design with pole placement constraints: an LMI approach.
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 41(3):358–367, 1996.
L. Chisci, A. Garulli, A. Vicino, and G. Zappa. Block recursive parallelotopic bounding in set
membership identification. Automatica, (34):15–22, 1998.
E. Chow and A Willsky. Analytical redundancy and the design of robust failure detection
systems. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 29(7):603–614, 1984.
C. Combastel, S. Gentil, and J.P. Rognon. Toward a better integration of residual generation
and diagnostic decision. In SafeProcess, Washington DC. USA, 2003. IFAC.
M. Cordier, P. Dague, M. Dumas, F. Levy, M. Montmain, J.and Staroswiecki, and L. TravéMas-
suyés. A comparative analysis of AI and control theory approaches to model-based diag-
nosis. In 14th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Berlin, Germany, 2000.
P. Cugueró, V. Puig, J. Saludes, and T. Escobet. A class of uncertain linear interval models
for which a set based robust simulation can be reduced to few pointwise simulations. In
Decision and Control, Las Vegas. USA., 2002.
Alejandro J. del Real, Alicia Arce, and Carlos Bordons. Development and experimental vali-
dation of a pem fuel cell dynamic model. Journal of Power Sources., 173(1):310–324, 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 113
L. El Ghauoui and G. Calafiore. Identification of arx models with time varying bounded pa-
rameters: a semi definite programming approach. In IFAC Symposium on System Identifi-
cation, Santa Barbara. California. USA., 2000.
T. Escobet, D. Feroldi, S. de Lira, V. Puig, J. Quevedo, J. Riera, andM. Serra. Model-based fault
diagnosis in pem fuel cell systems. Journal of Power Sources, (169):205–212, 2009.
E. Fogel and Y.F. Huang. On the value of information in system identification-bounded noise
case. Automatica, 18:229–238, 1982.
P. M. Frank and L. Keller. Sensitivity discriminating observer design for instrument failure
detection. IEEE Trans. Aero. and Electron. Syst, AES-16:460–467, 1981.
P.M. Frank. Enhancement of robustness in observer-based fault detection. In IFAC Sympo-
sium, Baden-Baden, 1991. SAFEPROCESS.
J.J. Gertler. Fault detection and isolation using parity relations. Contr. Eng. Practice, 5(5):
653–661, 1997.
J.J. Gertler. Survey of model-based failure detection and isolation in complex plants. IEEE
Control systemsmagazine, December 1998.
J.L. Gouzé, A Rapaport, andHadj-Sadok M.Z. Interval observers for uncertain biological sys-
tems. EcologicalModelling, (133):45–56, 2000.
W. Hamscher, Console. L., and J. Kleer. Readings in Model based Diagnosis. Morgan Kauf-
mann, san mateo edition, 1992.
E. Hansen. Global Optimization using Interval Analysis. Marcel Dekker, 1992.
D. Himmelblau. Fault detection and diagnosis in chemical and petrochemical processes.
Elsevvier, 1978.
D.T. Horak and J Guidance. Failure detection in dynamic systems with modelling errors.
Control and Dynamics, 11(6):508/–516, 1988.
S. Hui and S. Zak. Observer design for system with unknown inputs. Applied Mathematics
and Computer Science, 14:431–446, 2005.
A. Ingimundarson, J.M. Bravo, V. Puig, and T. Alamo. Robust fault diagnosis using
parallelotope-based set-membership consistency tests. In Conference on Decision and
Control & European Control Conference, Sevilla,Spain, 2005a.
114 BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Ingimundarson, J.M. Bravo, V. Puig, and T. Alamo. A new fault diagnosis algorithm that
improves the integration of fault detection and isolation. In Conference on Decision and
Control & European Control Conference, Sevilla,Spain, 2005b.
R. Isermann. Process fault detection based on modelling and estimation methods: A survey.
Automatica, 4(20):387–404, 1984.
R. Isermann. Supervision, fault detection and fault-diagnosis methods- an introduction.
Control Engineering Practice, 5(5):639–652, 1997. 1997.
R. Isermann and P. Balle. Terminology in the field of supervision, fault detection and fault
diagnosis. In SAFEPROCESS, England, 1996. IFAC.
R. Isermann and J. Chen. A review of parity space approaches to fault diagnosis. In IFAC
Safeprocess symposium, Baden-Baden, 1991.
Korbicz J., Patan K., and Obuchowicz A. Dynamic neural networks for process modelling
in fault detection and isolation systems. International Journal Applied Mathematic and
Computation Science, 9(3):519–546, 1999.
L. Jaulin, M. Kieffer, O. Didrit, and E. Walter. Applied Interval Analysis, with Examples in
Parameter and State Estimation. Robust Control and Robotics. Springer-Verlag, London,
2001.
H. L. Jones. Failure Detection in Linear Systems. PhD thesis, MIT, USA, 1973.
J.Y. Keller. Fault isolation filter design for linear stochastic systems. Automatica, 35(10):1701–
1706, 1999.
P. Kesavan and J. H. Lee. A set based approach to detection and isolation of faults in multi-
variable systems. Computers and Chemical Engineering, 25:925–940, 2001.
L.V. Kolev. Interval methods for circuit analysis. InWorld Scientific, Singapore, 1993.
Koscielny, J.M. Lorbicz, J. Lowalczuk, and Z. Cholewa. Fault Diagnosis. Pringer Verlag, 2004.
J.M. Kos´cielny. Fault isolation in industrial processes by the dynamic table of states method.
Automatica, 31(5):747–753, 1995.
J.M. Kos´cielny. Diagnostics of automated industrial process. Akademicka oficyna
Wydawnicza, 2001.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 115
J.M. Kos´cielny, J. Korbicz, Z. Kowalczuk, and W. Cholewa. Fault Diagnosis. Springer Verlag,
2004. Chapter 3.
W. Kuhn. Rigorously computed orbits of dynamical systems without the wrapping effect.
Computing, 61(1):47–67, 1998.
B. Kuipers. Qualitative reasoning: Modelling and simulation with incomplete knowledge.
MIT Press., Cambridge, M.A., 1994.
J. Laraminie and A. Dicks. Fuel cell systems explained. Wiley InterScience, 2003.
J. Larminie and A. Dicks. Fuel Cell Systems Explained. John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003.
R. Leicht, Q. Shen, G. Conghil, M. Chantler, and A. Slater. Qualitative model-based diagnosis
of dynamic systems. Colloquium of the Institution of Measurement and Control, 1994.
A. Lesecq, K.Q Barraud, and T. Dhin. Numerical accurate computations for ellipsoidal state
bounding. In 11th Mediterranean Conference on Control and Automation, pages 18–20.
MED’03, June 2003.
H. A. Liebhafsky and E. J. Cairns. Fuel Cells and Fuel Batteries: A Guide to Their Research and
Development. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1969.
J. Lunze. Qualitative modelling of linear dynamical systems with quantized state measure-
ments. Automatica, 30(3):417–431, 1994.
Frank P. M. Fault diagnosis in dynamic systems using analytical and knowledge based
redundancy- a survey and some new results. Automatica, 26(3):459–474, 1990.
MilaneseM., Norton J., Piet-Lahanier H, andWalter E. Bounding Approaches to System Iden-
tification. Plenum Press, New York, 1996.
D.Maksarov and J. Norton. State boundingwith ellipsoidal set description of the uncertainty.
International Journal of Control, 65(5):847 – 866, 1996.
R. K. Mehra and J. Peschon. An innovations approach to fault detction and diagnosis in dy-
namic systems. Automatica, 7:637–640, 1971.
L. A. Mironovski. Functional diagnosis of linear dynamic system: a survey. Automatic Remote
Control, 40:1198–1205, 1979.
L. A. Mironovski. Functional diagnosis of dynamic system: a survey. Automatic Remote Con-
trol, 41:1122–1143, 1980.
116 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Blomen M.J. Mugerwa M.N. Fuel Cell Systems. Plenum Press, 233 Spring Street, New York,
1993.
MugerwaM.N. Fuel cell systems, design optimization and environmental aspects of fuel cell
systems. KTI BV report, 1988.
R. Moore. Interval Analysis. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1966.
P. Moraal and I. Kolmanovsky. Turbocharger modeling for automotive control applications.
SAE Technical paper, 1(908):1–8, 1999.
P.J. Mosterman, R. Kapadia, and G. Biswas. Using bond graphs for diagnosis of dynamic
physical systems. InWorkshopPrinciple of Diagnosis, pages 81–85, Goslar, Germany, 1995.
DX.
K. Nickel. Interval analysis: How to fight the wrapping effect. Springer-Verlag, 1985. Interval
Analysis.
M.Nyberg. Model based fault diagnosis.Methods, theory and automotive engine applications.
PhD thesis, Linköping University, 1999.
J. Patton, P.M. Frank, and R. Clarke. Prentice-Hall International Systems And Control Engi-
neering, chapter VII. Prentice Hall, November 1989.
R. J. Patton, P. M. Frank, and R. N. Clark. Issues of Fault Diagnosis for Dynamic Systems.
Springer, 2000.
R.J. Patton. Robust model-based fault diagnosis: the state of the art. In SAFEPROCESS, 1994.
L. F. Pau. Failure diagnosis and performance monitoring. Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York,
1981.
Z. Pawlak. Information systems. theoretical foundation. Wydawnictwa Naukowo-Technicze,
WNT, 1983.
R. K. Pearson. Block-sequential algorithms for set-theoretic estimation. SIAM J. Matrix Anal.
Appl., 9:513–527, 1988.
T. Petti, J. Klein, and P.S. Dhurjati. Diagnostic model processor: using deep knowledge for
process fault diagnosis. AIChE Journal, 36(4):565–575, 1990.
S. Ploix and O. Adrot. Parity relations for linear uncertain dynamic systems. Automatica, 42
(9):1553–1562, September 2006.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 117
S. Ploix, O. Adrot, and J Ragot. Bounding approaches to the diagnosis of uncertain static
systems. In IFAC SafeProcess, Budapest, Hungary, 2000.
V. Puig, J. Saludes, and J. Quevedo. A new algorithm for adaptive threshold generation in ro-
bust fault detection based on a sliding window and global optimization. European Control
Conference, September 1999. Germany.
V. Puig, Cugueró P., J. Quevedo, and T. Escobet. Time-invariant approach to worst-case simu-
lation and observation of discrete-time uncertain systems. In Conference on Decision and
Control, Las Vegas. USA, 2002a.
V. Puig, J. Quevedo, T. Escobet, and S. De las Heras. Robust fault detection approaches using
interval models. In IFAC World Congress, Barcelona. Spain, 2002b.
V. Puig, J. Quevedo, T. Escobet, and A. Stancu. Passive robust fault detection using linear
interval observers. In Safe Process, Washington. USA, 2003a. IFAC.
V. Puig, J. Saludes, and J. Quevedo. Worst-case simulation of discrete linear time-invariant
interval dynamic systems. Reliable Computing, 9(4):251–290, 2003b.
V. Puig, A. Stancu, and J. Quevedo. Set versus trajectory based approaches to interval ob-
servation. In Conference on Decision and Control & European Control Conference, Sevilla.
Spain, 2005a.
V. Puig, A. Stancu, and J. Quevedo. Simulation of uncertain dynamics systems described by
interval models: a survey. In IFAC World Congress, Prague. Tzech Republic, 2005b. IFAC.
V. Puig, J. Quevedo, T. Escobet, and J.Meseguer. Towards a better integration of passive robust
interval-based fdi algorithms. 6th IFAC SAFEPROCESS, 16(5), 2006.
T. Pukrushpan andA.G. Stefanopoulou. Control-orientedmodeling and analysis for automo-
tive fuel cell systems. Automotive Research Center,Department ofMechanical Engineering.,
126:14–25, 2004.
B. Pulido and C. Alonso. Possible conflicts, ARRs, and conflicts. In 13th International Work-
shop on Principles of Diagnosis, DX02, pages 122–128, Austria, May 2002. DX.
Isermann R. Model-based fault-detection and diagnosis-status and applications. Annual
Reviews in Control, 29(1):71–85, 2005.
118 BIBLIOGRAPHY
C.A Ramos, R. Giral, L. Martinez, J. Romano, A. Romero, and G. Spagnuolo. A pem fuel cell
model featuring oxygen excess ratio estimation and power electronics interaction. IEEE.,
PP(99):6–8, 2008.
R.A. Reiter. Theory of diagnosis from first principles. Artificial Intelligence, 32:57–95, 1987.
B. Rinner and U. Weiss. On-line monitoring by dynamically refining imprecise models. IEEE
Trans. On SMC, 34(4):1811–1822, August 2004. Special Section on Diagnosis of Complex
Systems: Bridging themethodologies of the FDI and DX communities.
Clark R.N. Fault diagnosis in dynamic systems, theory and application. Prentice Hall, Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ„ patton rj and frank pm and clark rn edition, 1989.
W. Shevock. System Level Modeling of Thermal Transients in PEMFC Systems. PhD thesis,
Virginia Polytechnic and State University, USA, 2008.
M. Syfert and J.M. Kos´cielny. Fuzzy neural network based diagnostic system. application for
three tank system. pages 1631–1636, Porto, Portugal, 2001. Proc European Control Confer-
ence.
R. Tadeusiewicz. Pattern recognition. Polish Scientific Publisher, 1991.
J.U. Thoma and Bouamama B.O. Modelling and Simulation in Thermal and Chemical Engi-
neering. Springer Verlag, Berlin, 2000.
B. Tibken and E.P. Hofer. A new simulation tool for uncertain discrete time systems. In Euro-
pean Control Conference, Holland, September 1993.
S. G. Tzafestas and K. Watanabe. Modern approaches to system sensor fault detection and
diagnosis. Journal A, 31(4):42–57, 1990.
A. Tzes and K. Le. Fault detection for jump discrete systems. In The American Control Con-
ference. IEEE, 1999.
N. H. Ulerich and G. A. Powers. Online hazard aversion and fault diagnosis in chemical pro-
cesses: the digraph/fault tree method. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 37(2):171–177,
1988.
Office of Fossil energy U.S. Department of Energy and National Energy Technology Labora-
tory. Fuel Cell Handbook. 6th edition, 2002.
Puig V., Cuguero P., and Quevedo J. Worst-case estimation and simulation of uncertain
discrete-time systems using zonotopes. Proceedings of EuropeanControl Conference., page
Portual, 2001.
V. Venkatasubramanian, R. Rengaswamy, and Kewen Yin. A review of process fault detection
and diagnosis: Quantitative model-based methods. Computers and Chemical Engineer-
ing., 27(3):293–311, 2003.
A. Vicino and G. Zappa. Sequential approximation of feasible parameter sets for identifica-
tion with set membership uncertainty. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 41:774–
785, 1996.
N. Viswanadham and R. Srichander. Fault detection using unknown input observers.
Control-Theory and Advanced Technology, 3(2):91–101, 1987.
J. Watkins and S. Yurkovich. Fault detection using set-membership identification. In IFAC
World Congress, San Francisco, USA, 1996. IFAC.
A. S. Willsky and H. L. Jones. A generalized likelihood ratio approach to the detection and
estimation of jumps in linear systems. IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr, 21:108–121, 1976.
M. Witczak. Modelling and estimation strategies for fault diagnosis of non-linear systems:
from analytical to soft computing approaches. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2007. Lecture Notes
in Control and Information Sciences.
Ding X. and Frank P.M. Frequency domain approach and threshold selector for robustmodel-
based fault detection and isolation. In IFAC/IMACS Symp., pages 307–312, Baden-Baden,
1991. SAFEPROCESS.
119
